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The Dynamism of Health Law:
Expanded Insurance Coverage as the
Engine of Regulatory Reform
Gabriel Scheffler

Can law improve the delivery of health care? The predominant view is that law serves
as a barrier to reforming the health care delivery system. Health law scholars of all stripes
blame regulations for impeding innovation, limiting competition, and exacerbating
fragmentation in health care.
I argue that this view neglects an important—but overlooked—feature of health
law: the dynamic relationship between laws that expand health insurance coverage and laws
that regulate the delivery of health care. By expanding health insurance coverage and increasing
the demand for health care, laws such as Medicare, Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act
catalyze policymakers to experiment with reforms to delivery system regulations over time. I
chart the evolution of three key areas of delivery system law, and find that insurance
expansions have contributed to dramatic changes in each of these areas.
Recognizing health law’s “dynamism” sheds light on two debates that are central to
health care reform. First, contrary to what some scholars have argued, it reveals that expanding
health insurance coverage should be viewed as a catalyst for delivery system reform, rather than
being in competition with it. Second, it strengthens the case for further expanding health
insurance coverage. I argue that a dynamic regulatory system is better able to address problems
of access, costs, and quality; to adapt to other changes in the underlying health care system;
and to facilitate policy learning.
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INTRODUCTION
A central question in health law and policy concerns how to improve the
delivery of health care. It is often remarked that the United States spends far more
money than any other country on health care, and yet Americans on average have
worse life expectancies than other developed countries.1 Health scholars searching
for an explanation for this troubling disparity have tended to fixate on flaws in the
health care “delivery system”—problems with how doctors, hospitals, and other
health care providers deliver care to patients.2

1. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HEALTH AT A
GLANCE 2017: OECD INDICATORS, https://www.oecd.org/unitedstates/Health-at-a-Glance-2017Key-Findings-UNITED-STATES.pdf [ https://perma.cc/792G-WYTK] ( last visited Jan. 2, 2020 ).
2. See, e.g., JOHN E. WENNBERG ET AL., IMPROVING QUALITY AND CURBING HEALTH CARE
SPENDING: OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONGRESS AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION (2008); Donald M.
Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US Health Care, 307 JAMA 1513 (2012);
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These flaws are striking. By some estimates, around 25% or 30% of health
care spending is wasted on things like unnecessary care, administrative costs, and
outright fraud.3 Spending on medical care varies dramatically across different parts
of the country, but higher-spending regions do not have discernably better health
outcomes.4 Thousands of patients die each year as a result of preventable medical
errors.5 Americans pay prices for medical care that dwarf those in other developed
countries.6
Perhaps surprisingly to non-health specialists, many health scholars view the
law as the root of the problem.7 Richard Saver has called this view the
“law-as-barrier perspective,” holding that “inflexible legal rules constrain delivery
system innovation” by “block[ing] value-enhancing opportunities, often in favor of
incumbent stakeholder interests.”8

William M. Sage, Putting Insurance Reform in the ACA’s Rear-View Mirror, 51
HOUS. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2014) [hereinafter Sage, Insurance Reform] (noting that policy relating to
“medical services and products, rather than insurance . . . is commonly if inelegantly termed ‘delivery
system reform.’”).
3. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY
LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 12–13 (2013); William H. Shrank, Teresa L. Rogstad
& Natasha Perekh, Waste in the US Health Care System: Estimated Costs and Potential for Savings, 322
JAMA 1501 (2019).
4. See, e.g., Elliott S. Fisher et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending.
Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, 138 ANN. INT. MED. 273 (2003); Elliott S. Fisher
et al., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. Part 2: Health Outcomes and
Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANN. INT. MED. 288 (2003).
5. See INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (2000)
(estimating that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each year as a result of preventable medical
errors).
6. Gerard F. Anderson, Peter Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, It’s Still the Prices, Stupid: Why the
US Spends So Much on Health Care, and a Tribute to Uwe Reinhardt, 38 HEALTH AFF. 87 (2019).
7. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation and How to
Fix It, in THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE 1, 11 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010) [hereinafter
Elhauge, Health Care Fragmentation] (“The dominant cause of fragmentation . . . appears to be the law,
which dictates many of the fragmented features described above and thus precludes alterative [sic]
organizational structures.”); William M. Sage, Relating Health Law to Health Policy: A Frictional
3,
5–6
Account,
in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW
(I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William M. Sage eds., 2017) [hereinafter Sage, Relating Health
Law to Health Policy] (“The concrete—and correct—answer known mainly to health lawyers is that the
accumulation of professional privileges, judicial decisions, statutes and regulations, and unconditional
public subsidies over the course of more than a century has severely distorted U.S. healthcare markets
and crippled competition. Because of long-term regulation, production of health services is fragmented,
price competition is minimal, entry barriers are high, geographic markets are small and often
bottlenecked, large insurers and large providers are mutually entrenched, and innovation is channeled
toward inputs that best suit flawed production processes.”); Timothy S. Jost & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Legal
Reforms Necessary to Promote Delivery System Innovation, 299 JAMA 2561, 2561 (2008) (“One of the biggest
barriers to delivery system innovation is the complex web of laws and regulations.”).
8. Richard S. Saver, Health Law’s Uneasy Relationship with Delivery System Innovation, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 659, 659 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William
M. Sage eds., 2017) [hereinafter Saver, Uneasy Relationship]. Of note, Saver himself argues that law
“sometimes breaks this pattern quite dramatically” by “act[ing] as an endogenous force for ushering in
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Many of these criticisms focus on the laws governing the health care delivery
system. These laws—such as scope of practice restrictions, the corporate practice
of medicine doctrine, and Certificate of Need (CON) laws—regulate the supply of
health care. They determine, among other things, which professions and entities can
legally provide health care services, what types of services they can offer, and the
conditions and arrangements under which they can provide them.9 Although many
of these laws have laudable aims, such as protecting public safety and lowering
health care costs, health care scholars of all stripes have condemned them for
contributing to some of the most prominent afflictions troubling the health care
delivery system, including inadequate competition,10 excessive fragmentation,11 and
a dearth of innovation.12
To make matters worse, delivery system laws are viewed as difficult to change.
Scholars have emphasized the “path dependence” of health law,13 and describe
delivery system laws in particular as stagnant and antiquated.14 According to these
critics, the problem lies in a combination of inertia and interest group
dynamics: many of the existing laws are supported by interest groups such as

innovation, sometimes providing needed governmental support to overcome underproduction of
public-good-like services and delivery models.” Id. at 674.
9. See Sandra Johnson, Structure of Governmental Oversight of Quality in Healthcare, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 490, 490 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William
M. Sage eds., 2017).
10. William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Antitrust As Disruptive Innovation in Health
Care: Can Limiting State Action Immunity Help Save a Trillion Dollars?, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 723,
730–34 (2017).
11. See Elhauge, Health Care Fragmentation, supra note 7, at 1 (defining health care fragmentation
as a situation where “having multiple decision makers make a set of health care decisions that would be
made better through unified decision making”); Joan K. Krause, Integration, Fragmentation, and Human
Nature: The Role of the Fraud and Abuse Laws in a Changing Healthcare System, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 852, 852–53 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William
M. Sage eds., 2017) [hereinafter Krause, Integration, Fragmentation, and Human Nature]; Randall
D. Cebul, James B. Rebitzer, Lowell J. Taylor & Mark E. Votruba, Organizational Fragmentation and Care
Quality in the U.S. Healthcare System, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (2007).
12. See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, After the ACA: Freeing the Market for Healthcare, in THE
FUTURE OF HEALTHCARE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 161 (Anup Malani & Michael H. Schill
eds., 2015); Lesley H. Curtis & Kevin A. Schulman, Overregulation of Health Care: Musings on Disruptive
Innovation Theory, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2006); Jost & Emanuel, supra note 7.
13. See, e.g., Saver, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 673.
14. See, e.g., Allison K. Hoffman, What Health Reform Reveals About Health Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW 49, 61 (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman & William
M. Sage eds., 2017) (“[T]he ACA offers a window into how healthcare regulation can have paralyzing
effects on innovation, especially in healthcare delivery. Health law has entrenched an antiquated notion
of medicine—that of a doctor as a revered professional and lone wolf.”); Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not
Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX
243, 292 (2004) (characterizing the corporate practice of medicine doctrine as an “archaic doctrine”
that “does nothing to advance quality of care”); Peter D. Jacobson, Laura M. Napiewocki & Leah
A. Voigt, Regulating the U.S. Health Care System: Failure in Motion, 36 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 583, 585 (2011) (“[T]he rapidly changing health care delivery system requires a
dynamic regulatory capability, as opposed to the static regulatory approach now dominant.”).
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physicians and hospitals who benefit from the status quo.15 It is especially difficult
to change delivery system laws in a way that curbs health care spending, since doing
so will necessarily lead to reduced profits and job losses in the health care sector.16
This dynamic was most memorably articulated by the late economist Uwe
Reinhardt, who pronounced it a “cosmic law” that “Every dollar health
spending=Someone’s health-care income.”17
That is not to say there have been no efforts to change the status quo. To the
contrary, one of the central goals of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA) was to improve the delivery system.18 Most prominently, the ACA
included several initiatives designed to shift from a “fee-for-service” reimbursement
system, in which providers are reimbursed mainly based on the amount of care that
they provide (e.g., ordering a test, performing a procedure, etc.), to a “value-based
system,” in which providers are rewarded for improving patients’ health.19
Nevertheless, these efforts have been met with some skepticism from many health
scholars, who among other things point out that they largely leave the existing
delivery system regulations in place.20 Empirical evidence suggests that so far these

15. See Sage, Relating Health Law to Health Policy, supra note 7, at 13 (“American health law
strongly supports the medical profession.”); Saver, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 673 (“The ability
of incumbents to leverage law to block innovation is part of a larger pattern of path dependence
underlying the delivery system. Existing institutions and structures, as well as historical contingencies,
have channeled the delivery system along established directions, making more radical, innovative
change less likely.”); Sage & Hyman, supra note 10, at 732 (“The deep legal architecture of health care
strongly favors physician self-regulation, and furthers physicians’ professional insularity and
self-interest.”).
16. STEVEN BRILL, AMERICA’S BITTER PILL: MONEY, POLITICS, BACKROOM DEALS, AND
THE FIGHT TO FIX OUR BROKEN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 58 (2015) (quoting Jon Kingsdale) (“Though
there is broad agreement on the need for containment, any particular cost containment idea means
reducing revenue flow to somebody, and there is always stronger opposition from even a smaller party
than there is broad depth of broad support.”); Amitabh Chandra & Jonathan Skinner, Health Care
Employment Growth and the Future of US Cost Containment, 319 JAMA 1861 (2018).
17. UWE E. REINHARDT, PRICED OUT: THE ECONOMIC AND ETHICAL COSTS OF AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE 57 (2019).
18. See JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 155–81 (2011)
(summarizing the main delivery system reform provisions in the ACA); Sage, Insurance Reform, supra
note 2, at 1085 (“The ACA’s true breakthrough—and its arguable overreach—is not its attempt to
universalize health insurance, but its unprecedented goals of also making medical care better and more
efficient and of improving underlying health.”).
19. See WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, THE ECONOMIC RECORD OF THE
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: REFORMING THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1, 47–56 (2016) [hereinafter
ECONOMIC RECORD].
20. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101
GEO. L.J. 519, 525 (2013) [hereinafter Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats] (characterizing the set of Medicare
delivery system reforms in the ACA as a “disappointment”); Theodore Marmor & Jonathan
Oberlander, From HMOs to ACOs: The Quest for the Holy Grail in U.S. Health Policy, 27
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1215, 1217 (2012) (“[O]ur history of failed cost control offers sobering lessons
about exaggerated expectations, the limits of organizational reforms, and the recurring temptation to
oversell reform ideas like ACOs as panaceas and the harbingers of a new, radically transformed, and
vastly improved health care system.”); Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged
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payment reforms have yielded mixed results, leading to some improvements in
quality measures but relatively modest reductions in health care spending.21
In this Article, I argue that the “law-as-barrier perspective” neglects a central
feature of health law: the dynamic relationship between laws that expand health
insurance (“health care financing laws”) and laws regulating the delivery of health
care. In contrast to the perception of health law as stagnant and antiquated, I show
that health care financing laws are in fact largely responsible for what I refer to as
health law’s “dynamism.”
By increasing the demand for health care, these laws serve to catalyze state and
federal policymakers to repeatedly experiment with regulatory reforms designed to
improve access to health care, ensure quality, and reduce health care costs. The
expansion of health insurance has contributed to a dynamic system, one in which
regulators are frequently amending delivery system regulations, then monitoring and
assessing the consequences of those amendments in practice, and making further
changes when necessary. This Article illustrates how the enactment of Medicare and
Medicaid and the ACA have promoted this dynamism by showing how they have
contributed to substantial changes in three consequential areas of delivery system
law, each of which is viewed as emblematic of the “law-as-barrier perspective.”
Uncovering this dynamic relationship also has implications for the future of
health care reform. It implies that expanding health insurance should be viewed as
a catalyst for delivery system reform, rather than being in competition with it.
Contrary to Richard Epstein and David Hyman, who argue that achieving universal
health insurance without reforming the regulations governing the health care
delivery system will only further lock us into “the current dysfunctional state of
affairs,”22 in fact the opposite is true. The history of the interactions between health
care financing laws and health care delivery laws suggests that future efforts to
further expand health insurance (whether through enacting a single payer-system or
through building on the ACA’s existing framework) will create pressure for more
fundamental reforms to this legal regime—and to the structure of the health care
delivery system.

Constitution of American Healthcare, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 221 (2012) (“The ACA’s
architecture is clearly and profoundly solicitous of the extant structures of the medical delivery
system.”). But see Einer R. Elhauge, Obamacare and the Theory of the Firm, in THE FUTURE OF
HEALTHCARE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 202, 217 (Anup Malani & Michael H. Schill eds., 2015)
(pointing out that the Affordable Care Act at least provides regulators with some tools for the federal
government “to remove legal barriers to efficient health care integration”).
21. See, e.g., Jonathan Skinner & Amitabh Chandra, The Past and Future of the Affordable Care
Act, 316 JAMA 497, 497–98 (2016); J. Michael McWilliams et al., Early Performance of Accountable Care
Organizations in Medicare, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2357 (2016); Austin Frakt, ‘Value’ of Care Was a
Big Goal. How Did It Work Out?, N.Y. TIMES UPSHOT (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/09/23/upshot/medicare-health-value-costs.html [ https://perma.cc/JK3G-7XQP ].
22. Richard A. Epstein & David A. Hyman, Fixing Obamacare: The Virtues of Choice,
Competition, and Deregulation, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 493, 516 (2013).
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I also conclude that this dynamism is a positive force for improving health
care delivery, and that recognizing it strengthens the case for further expanding
health insurance coverage. First, expanding insurance coverage prompts reforms
aimed at addressing problems of access, costs, and quality. Second, it enables
delivery system regulations to evolve in response to other changes in the health care
system. Third, it facilitates learning about the optimal regulatory approach by
enabling policymakers to reverse course and correct mistakes. These advantages are
especially important in the context of health care, given the strong justifications for
expanding health insurance coverage, the continual evolution in health care
technology and modes of delivering patient care, and the uncertainty as to the
optimal strategy for regulating the health care delivery.
As far as I am aware, this is the first work to explore the general relationship
between expanding health insurance coverage and reforming health care delivery
laws. Kenneth Arrow foreshadowed health law’s dynamism in his classic 1963
article, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, albeit in very general
terms.23 Other scholars such as Paul Starr and John Kingdon have pointed out how
the enactment of Medicare precipitated new regulations aimed at reducing health
care costs in particular,24 while Joan Krause, Frances Miller, and Clark Havighurst
have examined the implications of health insurance expansions for fraud and abuse
laws.25 Yet these earlier works do not take a holistic view of how health care
financing laws influence health care delivery laws by influencing the demand for
health care, nor do they fully develop the implications of this relationship for health
law and policy.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I reviews three of the most prominent
and widely criticized types of health care delivery system laws—scope of practice
restrictions, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, and CON
regulations—and outlines the prevailing view of these laws as barriers to improving
the delivery of health care.
Part II then examines why expanding health insurance coverage has served to
transform these laws. It first shows that increasing insurance coverage serves to
increase the demand for health care through several channels; next, drawing on
work by Arrow and Kingdon, it explains why this increase in demand in turn creates
pressure to reform health care delivery laws.
Part III then illustrates this causal chain by showing how Medicare and
Medicaid—and to a lesser extent, the ACA—have led to changes in each of the
23. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) [hereinafter Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care].
24. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 106–07
(2011); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 398–404 (1982)
[hereinafter STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION].
25. See Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law—We Need to Talk!, 19 HEALTH
AFF. 84, 88–90 (2000); Joan H. Krause, Fraud in Universal Coverage: The Usual Suspects (And Then Some),
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1151 (2007); Frances H. Miller, Doctors’ Conflicts of Interest (& Altruism) in the United
States and Great Britain, 27 IND. L. REV. 687, 693 (1994).
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aforementioned three areas of delivery system law. Somewhat surprisingly, these
changes have not been consistently pro-regulatory or deregulatory: health care
financing laws contributed to the enactment of CON laws, but they have also
contributed to the curtailment of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and
scope of practice restrictions—both of which predated the widespread availability
of health insurance.
Part IV argues that expanding health insurance coverage is the best way to
achieve more fundamental reforms to health care delivery laws. It also argues that
on balance, having a dynamic regulatory system in health care is normatively
desirable in health care, and that recognizing this dynamism strengthens the case
for further expanding coverage.
The Article concludes by exploring the implications of this dynamism for the
field of health law as a whole. In contrast to the popular characterization of health
law as a “patchwork” of divergent laws with little internal coherence,26 I argue that
uncovering the linkages between health care financing laws and health care delivery
laws strengthens the case for conceptualizing and approaching health law as a
distinct field of scholarly inquiry.
I. HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM LAWS AND THEIR DISCONTENTS
Health care providers are subject to a voluminous array of federal regulations,
state laws, and private certifications and standards.27 In this section, I limit myself
to briefly describing three prominent areas of law governing the delivery of health
care, and sketching out some of the main criticisms that have been leveled against
them. These laws have two main things in common: First, they are widely viewed
as impeding beneficial developments in the delivery of health care by restraining
innovation, limiting competition, and increasing fragmentation. Second, they are
perceived as emblematic of health law’s intractable nature, and of its excessive
deference to health care providers.
A. Scope of Practice Restrictions
State occupational licensing laws are the oldest form of laws governing the
health care delivery system.28 These laws generally provide that it is unlawful to
practice without a license, lay out certain educational, training, and testing
requirements, and establish a state licensing board (usually primarily composed of

26. See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 321 (2003)
(“The law of health care provision is a chaotic, dysfunctional patchwork.”).
27. Kieran Walshe & Stephen M. Shortell, Social Regulation of Healthcare Organizations in the
United States: Developing a Framework for Evaluation, 17 HEALTH SERV. MGMT. RES. 79, 79–80 (2004).
28. See Lewis A. Grossman, The Origins of American Health Libertarianism, 13 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 76, 88–89 (2013) (describing how some states enacted medical licensing laws before
the American Revolutionary War).
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members of the licensed profession) to interpret and enforce the statute.29 In
addition, licensing laws specify the range of services that health care providers are
allowed to perform—their so-called “scope of practice”—along with any relevant
conditions.30
Licensing laws set quite different scopes of practice for different professions.
Physicians were the first health care profession to be licensed,31 and are the only
health care profession whose legal scope of practice is “all-encompassing.”32
Licensing laws grant the exclusive authority to physicians to perform any service
that is circumscribed within “the practice of medicine,” which tends to be defined
quite expansively. For instance, Indiana’s medical practice act defines the practice
of medicine as including:
[T]he diagnosis, treatment, correction, or prevention of any disease,
ailment, defect, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain, or other condition of
human beings; the suggestion, recommendation, or prescription or
administration of any form of treatment, without limitation; [and] the
performing of any kind of surgical operation upon a human being,
including tattooing.33
Because the practice of medicine is deemed to be exclusively within the
purview of physicians, any non-physician who knowingly engages in any of these
services without a medical license could be deemed to be practicing medicine
without a license—which in this case is deemed a Class C felony.34
By contrast, other health care providers, including nurses, physician assistants,
pharmacists, and dental hygienists, have had to carve out much narrower scopes of
practice. For example, Indiana defines “practical nursing” to include:
[C]ontributing to the assessment of the health status of individuals or
groups; participating in the development and modification of the strategy
of care; implementing the appropriate aspects of the strategy of care;
maintaining safe and effective nursing care; and participating in the
evaluation of responses to the strategy of care.35
Licensing laws also often require that non-physicians must be supervised by a
physician in order to perform certain types of tasks. For instance, Indiana allows
29. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS
JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW 6 (2015); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost,
Introduction—Regulation of the Healthcare Professions, in REGULATION OF THE HEALTHCARE
PROFESSIONS 2–5 (Timothy Jost ed., 1992).
30. Johnson, supra note 9, at 504–09.
31. Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-Care Providers’ Scopes of
Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 9 YALE J. REG. 301, 306 (2002).
32. Barbara Safriet, Impediments to Progress in Health Care Workforce Policy: License and Practice
Laws, 31 INQUIRY 310, 311 (1994).
33. Johnson, supra note 9, at 502–03 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5-1-1.1 (1978))
(emphasis added).
34. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-22.5-8-2 (1978).
35. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-23-1-1.3 (1993).
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nurse anesthetists to “administer anesthesia if the certified registered nurse
anesthetist acts under the direction of and in the immediate presence of
a physician.”36
Although some scope of practice requirements may be warranted, others place
excessive limitations on the types of functions performed by non-physician health
care providers, thereby limiting access to health care—and potentially also raising
health care costs.37 William Sage and David Hyman describe licensing laws as “the
most pernicious practice,” and argue that they “discourage existing competitors
from adopting practices introduced to the market by disruptive innovators” and
“limit the ability of other licensed health professionals to enter the market, even
when they have extensive training in diagnosis and treatment.”38
One illustrative piece of evidence that scope of practice requirements are not
set at an optimal level is that they vary widely from state to state. For example,
whereas twenty-two states and the District of Columbia allow Nurse Practitioners
(NPs) to diagnose patients, initiate and manage certain conditions, and prescribe
medications independently, twelve states require NPs to have physician oversight
in order to prescribe, diagnose, and treat patients.39 This variation cannot be
justified by quality concerns, given that health care education and training standards
are evidence-based and set nationally.40
A wide range of institutions, including the Institute of Medicine, the Pew
Health Professions Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission have argued
in favor of expanding scope of practice restrictions for health professionals such as
Advanced Practice Nurses (APNs) (a category that includes Nurse Practitioners,
Registered Nurse Anesthetists, Nurse-Midwives, and Clinical Nurse Specialists)41 as
a way to improve access to both primary and acute care without sacrificing quality.42
36. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-23-1-30 (1993).
37. See, e.g., E. Kathleen Adams & Sara Markowitz, Improving Efficiency in the Health-Care
System: Removing Anticompetitive Barriers for Advanced Practice Registered Nurses and
Physician Assistants, THE HAMILTON 7 ( June 2018), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/
removing_anticompetitive_barriers_for_advanced_practice_registered_nurses_a [https://perma.cc/
Y43T-L8ZR]; Morris M. Kleiner, Allison Marier, Kyoung Won Park & Coady Wing, Relaxing
Occupational Licensing Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service, 59
J.L. & ECON. 261 (2016); Gabriel Scheffler, Unlocking Access to Health Care: A Federalist Approach to
Reforming Occupational Licensing, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 293, 310–15 (2019); Tanya Wanchek, Dental
Hygiene Regulation and Access to Oral Healthcare: Assessing the Variation Across the US States, 48
BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 706 (2010).
38. Sage & Hyman, supra note 10, at 734.
39. Scheffler, supra note 37, at 313–14.
40. Robert Kocher, Topher Spiro, Emily Oshima Lee, Gabriel Scheffler, Stephen Shortell,
David Cutler & Ezekiel Emanuel, Doctors Without State Borders: Physicians Practicing Across State Lines,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 18, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/02/18/doctors-withoutstate-borders-practicing-across-state-lines/ [ https://perma.cc/RU64-Z224 ].
41. Nat’l Council of State Boards of Nursing, APRNS in the U.S., NCSBN, https://
www.ncsbn.org/aprn.htm [ https://perma.cc/3LNQ-GTYA ] ( last visited Jan. 2, 2020 ).
42. See, e.g., EDITH RAMIREZ, JULIE BRILL, MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN & JOSHUA WRIGHT,
FED. TRADE COMM’N, POLICY PERSPECTIVES: COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF
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B. The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine
The general rationale of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine is to
prevent corporations, as well as individuals who do not possess a medical license,
from unduly interfering with medical decision-making.43 It entails three specific
related prohibitions: First, it prevents unlicensed individuals or corporations from
directly employing physicians. Second, it prevents unlicensed individuals from
owning or controlling entities that provide health care services. Third, it prohibits
licensed health care providers from engaging in “fee splitting,” sharing their
professional earnings with unlicensed individuals or entities.44
The origins of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine date back to the
early twentieth century, when the American Medical Association (AMA) was
growing increasingly concerned by the advent of new business-oriented health care
delivery models.45 At least two new delivery models began to crop up during that
period: “contract practice,” in which corporations directly employed physicians to
provide medical care for their own employees; and “corporate practice,” in which
corporations employed or contracted with physicians and advertised their services
to the public.46 Critics of these models, including the AMA, perceived these
arrangements as threats to the autonomy of the medical profession and to the
quality of patient care.47 More cynically, physicians opposed these corporate models
because they threatened to dilute the profits from delivering health care.48
In response, the AMA introduced new restrictions in its code of professional
ethics against both contract practice and corporate practice, such as those
condemning any arrangements under which corporations profit from providing
medical services.49 In addition, a series of court rulings during the early twentieth
ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSES (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/policy-perspectivescompetition-regulation-advanced-practice-nurses [ https://perma.cc/BL66-PQ3X ]; INST. OF MED.,
THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH 9 (2011); LEONARD
J. FINOCCHIO ET AL., PEW HEALTH PROFESSIONS COMM’N, REFORMING HEALTH CARE
WORKFORCE REGULATION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 9–13 (1995).
43. Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 251–52.
44. Id. at 244.
45. CHRISTY FORD CHAPIN, ENSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE PUBLIC CREATION OF
THE CORPORATE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 20 (2015) (“The notion of an overtly competitive,
commercial health care market dominated by medical corporations terrified physician leaders.”);
STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 198–99.
46. CHAPIN, supra note 45, at 16–20; STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at
200–06; Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the
Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445, 456–57 (1987); Adam M. Freiman, The
Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Injecting a Dose of Efficiency into
the Modern Health Care Environment, EMORY L.J. 697, 702 (1998); Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 247–48.
47. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46, at 457–58; Freiman, supra note 46, at 702.
48. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 215–16 (“Doctors opposed corporate
enterprise in medical practice not only because they wanted to preserve their autonomy, but also
because they wanted to prevent the emergence of any intermediary or third party that might keep for
itself the profits potentially available in the practice of medicine.”).
49. Freiman, supra note 46, at 703.
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century held that corporate practice arrangements violated state medical licensing
laws.50 Although most medical practice acts do not explicitly prohibit the corporate
practice of medicine, courts interpreted their requirements that persons have a valid
license in order to practice medicine as implicitly also prohibiting corporations from
practicing medicine.51 In some cases, courts justified their interpretations of medical
practice acts by relying on public policy concerns: for example, worrying that the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine would impair the doctor-patient
relationship or commercialize the medical profession.52
As the practice of medicine has evolved from solo practitioners to large
integrated health care organizations, the doctrine has ceased to be enforced in most
states.53 The Supreme Court dealt the AMA a major setback in 1982 when it
affirmed a Federal Trade Commission order that the AMA’s ethical restraints on
the corporate practice of medicine violated the Federal Trade Commission Act.54
In addition, many states have carved out explicit exceptions to the doctrine,
including for non-profit health care organizations, health care organizations owned
and managed by licensed physicians, health maintenance organizations (HMOs),
and medical schools.55
Nevertheless, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine continues to
influence how health care organizations are structured and managed today. The
corporate practice doctrine helps to explain, for example, why Medicare pays
doctors separately from hospitals, and why hospital staffs in the United States are
typically members of independent medical staffs, rather than hospital employees.56
Medical staff committees, rather than the hospital, are generally responsible for

50. See, e.g., Parker v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of State of Cal., 216 Cal. 285, 295 (1932) (“The
letter of the statute authorizes persons only to engage in the practice of dentistry. The underlying theory
upon which the whole system of dental laws is framed is that the state’s licensee shall possess
consciousness, learning, skill, and good moral character, all of which are individual characteristics, and
none of which is an attribute of an artificial entity.”); People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85 Colo. 304,
313 (1929) (“It is, however, altogether clear that the inhibition of the statute against the practice of
dentistry in this state is applicable not only to natural persons, but it applies as well to an artificial person
or a corporation, because, in the very nature of things, the corporation cannot meet the conditions
upon which the right to a license depends, and no one, whether an ordinary person or an artificial
being, is entitled to practice unless, among other requirements, he first secures a license from our state
board of dental examiners.”).
51. See Freiman, supra note 46, at 704–4–05; Right of the Corporation to Practice Medicine, 48
YALE L.J. 346, 347–48 (1938); Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 250–051.
52. See, e.g., Bartron v. Codington Cty., 68 S.D. 309, 329 (1942) (“Being convinced that the
practice of the learned professions by a profit corporation tends to the commercialization and
debasement of those professions, we are of the opinion that such a mode of conducting the practice is
in contravention of the public interest and is against public policy.”).
53. Freiman, supra note 46, at 733–40.
54. Am. Med. Ass’n v. F.T.C., 455 U.S. 676 (1982).
55. See Freiman, supra note 46, at 706–08.
56. MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW
AND ETHICS 1273 (8th ed. 2013).
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overseeing physicians working in the hospital.57 The prevailing view is that while
corporate practice prohibitions have been weakened, they remain “‘legal landmines,’
remnants of an old and nearly forgotten war, half-buried on a field fast being built
up with new forms of health care organizations.”58 The fear of tripping these
landmines hampers innovation by inhibiting health care organizations from
experimenting with new delivery models.59
Over the years, many scholars have argued in favor of abolishing the corporate
practice of medicine doctrine altogether.60 These critics argue that the original
justifications undergirding the doctrine no longer apply in a world in which the
delivery of health care is increasingly team-based, and where managed care
companies exert influence over how care is delivered.61 Rather than serving to
promote quality, they argue that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in fact
degrades the quality of health care by making our health care delivery system more
fragmented.62 Critics argue that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine
contributes to this fragmentation by preventing health care organizations from
exerting control over physicians’ decisions and making it more difficult for health
care organizations to implement patient-safety initiatives.63
C. Certificate of Need Laws
Certificate of Need (CON) laws were ostensibly designed to halt the growth
in health care spending by requiring hospitals to demonstrate “community need”
before making new capital investments.64 The theory underlying CON laws, known
as “Roemer’s Law” (named after health services researcher Milton Roemer), was
that the construction of new health care facilities itself leads to unnecessary health
care utilization—a theory succinctly encapsulated by the maxim, “a built bed is a

57. Kristin Madison, Defragmenting Health Care Delivery Through Quality Reporting, in THE
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 87 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2010).
58. Arnold J. Rosoff, The Business of Medicine: Problems with the Corporate Practice Doctrine, 17
CUMB. L. REV. 485 (1986); see also Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46, at 470–71; Huberfeld, supra note 14, at
253 (“While the doctrine may seem too outdated to be enforced, the statutes and regulations that form
the doctrine remain in current statutory compilations and, like a sleeping dragon, need only a slight
stimulus to be set into action.”).
59. See Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46, at 470; see also Saver, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at
660 (defining health care delivery innovations as “typically alter[ing] the bundle of healthcare services
offered, how the services are paid for, the process for delivering the services, the medical personnel
involved, the site of delivery, the use of products and technology, or the organizational structure under
which care is provided”).
60. See, e.g., Cebul et al., supra note 11, at 109; Huberfeld, supra note 14; Jost & Emanuel, supra
note 7, at 2562.
61. Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 257–60.
62. Cebul et al., supra note 11.
63. See Elhauge, Health Care Fragmentation, supra note 7, at 12.
64. James B. Simpson, Full Circle: The Return of Certificate of Need Regulation of Health Facilities
to State Control, 19 IND. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (1986).
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filled bed.”65 Perhaps counterintuitively, hospitals have historically found CON
laws appealing, both as a means of erecting barriers to entry for potential
competitors and as a way of forestalling more dramatic government intervention
into the health care market.66
CON laws grew out of previous “health planning” initiatives that involved the
federal government and state governments in the construction of health care
facilities.67 The most prominent of these was the Hill-Burton Act of 1946, which
provided federal grants and loans to states that came up with detailed plans
identifying their need for new health care facilities and how to address those needs.68
CON laws emerged during the 1960s and early 1970s, at a time when hospital
prices were rising at six percent above the general rate of inflation.69 New York
enacted the first CON law in 1964, and twenty states enacted their own CON laws
between the 1971 and 1973 legislative sessions.70 In 1974, Congress passed the
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act (NHPRDA), which
offered funding to state CON programs that met certain federal standards.71 By
1980, all fifty states had enacted their own CON legislation.72
The heyday of CON laws proved to be short-lived, however, and they fell out
of favor during the 1980s. The advent of managed care and the introduction of
Medicare’s Prospective Payment System created new incentives for hospitals to
control health care spending, which in turn appeared to render CON less
necessary.73 This was accompanied by a growing perception among policymakers
and researchers that CON laws were failing to reduce health care spending.74 In
1987, Congress turned against CON laws and repealed the NHPRDA,75 prompting

65. Nicholas Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L.J. 57, 88 (2015) [hereinafter
Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling].
66. See STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 398–99 (“The interest of state
legislatures was plainly cost control. However, the main inspiration for certificate-of-need came from
the American Hospital Association and its state affiliates. The hospitals, anxious to avoid other forms
of control, stood to benefit from the limits on competition that this sort of regulation would create.”);
see also Sallyanne Payton & Rhoda M. Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue
Cross, and Certificate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203 (1980) (arguing that these were in fact the driving
goals behind CON laws, rather than controlling health care spending).
67. See Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, supra note 65, at 85–88.
68. Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2012).
69. MARTIN S. FELDSTEIN, THE RISING COST OF HOSPITAL CARE 13 (1971).
70. Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by “Certificate of Need”, 59
VA. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1973) [hereinafter Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by
“Certificate of Need”].
71. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88
Stat. 2225 (1975).
72. HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 56, at 1223.
73. Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, supra note 65, at 89; Christopher J. Conover & Frank
A. Sloan, Does Removing Certificate-of-Need Regulations Lead to a Surge in Health Care Spending?, 23
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 455, 456–57 (1998).
74. Id.
75. Drug Export Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–660, § 701, 100 Stat. 3743, 3799 (1986).
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eleven states to repeal their CON laws by 1990.76 In recent years, however, the drive
to abolish CON laws has slowed,77 and as of February 2019, thirty-four states plus
the District of Columbia still have CON programs in place.78
CON laws have also been the subject of widespread criticism.79 The most
prominent criticism of CON laws is that they are anti-competitive. By restricting
new entrants into the market, CON laws exacerbate hospital concentration and
potentially impede innovation.80 The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission have repeatedly criticized CON laws, writing, “on balance, CON
programs are not successful in containing health care costs, and . . . they pose
serious anticompetitive risks that usually outweigh their purported economic
benefits.”81 Others have argued that CON laws are vehicles for politically influential
hospitals to secure favorable regulatory treatment at the expense of less
well-connected ones.82
There are few scholars who are willing to defend CON programs as currently
constituted.83 Several scholars and policymakers have called for amending CON
laws or even repealing them outright.84 Others have argued that the real problem
with CON programs is that they are too limited, as they have no authority to limit
hospitals’ operating expenses or control hospitals’ prices, and that more expansive
regulatory programs could more effectively control health care spending.85
*

*

*

76. Matthew D. Mitchell & Christopher Koopman, 40 Years of Certificate-of-Need Laws Across
America, MERCATUS CTR. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/40-yearscertificate-need-laws-across-america [ https://perma.cc/MJ7B-ZQ96 ].
77.
Emily Whelan Parento, Certificate of Need in the Post-Affordable Care Act Era, 105
KY. L.J. 201, 212 (2017).
78. Certificate of Need State Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2016), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/health/con-certificate-of-need-state-laws.aspx [ https://perma.cc/UVB4LMX5 ].
79. See, e.g., HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 56, at 1225–26 (subsection entitled
“The Failure of CON Regulation”).
80. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 96
(2015).
81. F.T.C. & U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION 22
(2004).
82. See Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by “Certificate of Need,” supra note
70, at 1186–87 (“Limited investigation suggests further that established community hospitals, major
medical centers, hospitals associated with religious and similar organizations, and well-entrenched
proprietaries seem to be capable of receiving special attention for applications which would be rejected
out of hand if submitted by less well-connected interests.”).
83. Parento, supra note 77, at 218 (“Among academic scholars, it is rare to find ardent, or even
lukewarm defenders of CON programs.”).
84. See, e.g., Jost & Emanuel, supra note 7, at 2562; Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Certificate of Need
Laws: A Prescription for Higher Costs, 30 ANTITRUST 50, 53 (2015) (“[T]here has been a lengthy,
bipartisan consensus at the FTC that state CON laws should be repealed.”); William M. Sage, Getting
the Product Right: How Competition Policy Can Improve Health Care Markets, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 1076,
1080 (2014) (calling for reducing or removing CON laws, and other barriers to market entry).
85. HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 56, at 1225.
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In sum, the predominant view of these three types of laws—scope of practice
restrictions, the corporate practice of medicine doctrine, and CON laws—is that
they represent barriers to improving the health care delivery system. In addition,
they are perceived as difficult to change, largely because they are supported by
interest groups who benefit from the status quo. Although this view has some truth
to it, I show in Parts II and III that this “law-as-barrier perspective” overlooks a
central feature of health law: the impact of health care financing laws on the health
care delivery system.
II. PATHWAYS OF INFLUENCE
This Section explores the relationship between health care financing laws and
health care delivery laws in two stages. First, it outlines three different channels
through which health care financing laws serve to increase the demand for health
care. Second, it explains why increasing the demand for health care in turn affects
health care delivery laws. Drawing on work by Kenneth Arrow and John Kingdon,
it shows that the connection between health insurance and health care delivery laws
can be viewed as one manifestation of a larger relationship between market failures
and nonmarket institutions in health care.
A. Health Care Financing Laws and the Demand for Health Care
Health care financing laws serve to transform health care delivery laws
through increasing the demand for health care. Historically, this has transpired
through three main channels: First, expanding health insurance increases patients’
access to care and causes patients to utilize more health care services. Second,
financing laws have encouraged providers to deliver more health care services by
increasing the amount of money in the health care system and paying providers
based on the amount of services they provide (known as “fee-for-service”
reimbursement). Third, over time, expanding health insurance also leads hospitals
and medical centers to adopt new expensive new medical technologies, and sends a
signal to technology developers to create more such technologies. This Section
briefly discusses each of these mechanisms, as well as the benefits and concerns
associated with them.
1. Increasing Patients’ Access to Health Care
The first—and most obvious—way that expanding health insurance serves to
increase the demand for health care is through increasing patients’ access to health
care services.86 Improving access to health care is one of the central purposes of
86. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 4 (1993) (defining
health care access as having “the timely use of personal health services to achieve the best possible health
outcomes”).
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health insurance—and one of the central goals of health care reform.87 By lowering
the cost that individuals face when obtaining health care, health insurance enables
patients to access health care that they value but would not otherwise be able
to afford.88
A large body of empirical research confirms that expanding health insurance
coverage improves access to health care and causes patients to use more health care
services.89 The two most well-known studies on the effects of health insurance are
both randomized controlled trials: the RAND Health Insurance Experiment and
the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. The RAND Experiment, conducted in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, randomly assigned participants to different health
insurance plans with different levels of cost-sharing (i.e., these plans covered
different percentages of individuals’ total health care costs), and found that those
individuals enrolled in plans with lower cost-sharing had higher levels of health care
utilization.90 More recently, in 2008, the state of Oregon randomly allocated
Medicaid coverage to recipients via a lottery, allowing researchers to compare
individuals who received Medicaid coverage to those with no health insurance.91
Follow-up analyses found that those recipients who gained Medicaid coverage had
more hospital admissions, emergency department visits, and outpatient visits, and
ordered more prescription drugs.92

87. See, e.g., Timothy Jost, Affordability: The Most Urgent Health Reform Issue for Ordinary
Americans, HEALTH AFF . B LOG (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20160229.053330/full/ [ https://perma.cc/W2NU-FK4G?type=image ] (“A primary goal of the
ACA was to improve access to health care.”); Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got
to Do with It? Recognizing Health Insurance As a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 436,
439 (2010) (“A key goal of health reform is to give everyone access to health care. Health insurance is
simply a means to that larger end: appropriate, affordable health care regardless of employment,
residence, health status, age or other factors that currently inhibit access.”); see also Allison K. Hoffman,
Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 159 U. PENN L. REV. 1873, 1888 (2011) (calling the “Health Promotion” theory of health insurance
as the theory “that the primary goal of health insurance is to mitigate the risk of harms to health”).
88. John A. Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation, 32 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 759, 768 (2007) [hereinafter Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation].
89. See Benjamin D. Sommers, Atul A. Gawande & Katherine Baicker, Health Insurance
Coverage and Health—What the Recent Evidence Tells Us, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 586, 588 (2017)
(describing several studies which find that health insurance expansions increase health care utilization).
90. See generally JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (1993).
91. In this respect, it differed from the RAND Experiment, which compared individuals who
all had health insurance but with different levels of cost-sharing. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Moral
Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It, 16 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 957,
963–64 (2018), https://economics.mit.edu/files/14545 [https://perma.cc/M4A5-VR3F].
92. See AMY FINKELSTEIN, MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE 21 (2015) [hereinafter
FINKELSTEIN, MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE]; Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health
Insurance
Experiment:
Evidence
from
the
First
Year,
127
Q.J. ECON. 1057 (2012)Amy Finkelstein et al., Effect of Medicaid Coverage on ED Use — Further
Evidence from Oregon’s Experiment, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1505 (2016).
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There is also a growing body of empirical evidence that expanding health
insurance improves health outcomes by increasing access to health care. In 2017,
Benjamin Sommers, Atul Gawande, and Katherine Baicker conducted a thorough
review of the empirical literature on the effects of health insurance, and concluded
that “coverage expansions significantly increase patients’ access to care and use of
preventive care, primary care, chronic illness treatment, medications, and surgery,”
and that “some of these changes will ultimately help tens of thousands of people
live longer lives.”93 More recent studies have continued to bolster the link between
health insurance expansions and improved health outcomes.94
Despite the benefits of health insurance coverage, economists and
policymakers have historically been quite concerned that health insurance leads to
excess demand for health care.95 The theory underlying this concern, referred to as
moral hazard, is that by lowering the price of health care, insurance causes people to
consume health care services that they do not value sufficiently to justify the costs
of providing that care.96
Concerns about moral hazard have led a number of health economists over
the years to theorize that health insurance is inefficient.97 Mark Pauly first
articulated this possibility in an influential 1968 essay, venturing that the total
benefits from health insurance in terms of reducing financial risk could potentially
be smaller than its costs in terms of causing excess utilization and health care
spending.98 In a 1973 article, Martin Feldstein went further, concluding—at a time

93. Sommers, Gawande & Baicker, supra note 89, at 590–91.
94. See, e.g., Sameed Ahmed M. Khatana et al., Association of Medicaid Expansion with
Cardiovascular Mortality, 4 JAMA CARDIOLOGY 671 (2019) (finding that Medicaid expansion was
associated with lower cardiovascular mortality).
95. See ECONOMIC RECORD, supra note 19, at 27 n.13 (“While many non-economists consider
it a self-evidently good thing when expanded insurance coverage increases use of health care, a
long-standing strand of economic research emphasizes the possibility that health insurance will drive
overconsumption of health care by insulating enrollees from the cost of services, a phenomenon
referred to as ‘moral hazard.’”) (citation omitted).
96. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?, 6
J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 15 (1992) (“[T]he dominant view of health insurance in the economics literature, at
least in the American literature, is that ‘too much’ health insurance leads consumers to demand ‘too
much’ medical care at each point in time, which is reasonably well established, as well as ‘too much’
technological change, which is less well established.”). One potential alternative form of moral hazard,
which is referred to as ex ante moral hazard (as opposed to the predominant notion of moral hazard,
which is sometimes called ex post moral hazard), is the notion that having health insurance causes
individuals to take less good care of their health. Yet there is little empirical evidence substantiating this
effect. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 284 (1996) (“There is
no strong evidence that insurance reduces the level of care individuals take to prevent bodily injury.”);
Einav & Finkelstein, supra note 91, at 963.
97. Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation, supra note 88, at 765.
98. Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 531, 535
(1968); see also JOHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE 9 (2003)
[hereinafter NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE] (referring to Pauly’s
article as perhaps “the single most influential article in the health economics literature”).
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when over 24 million Americans were uninsured99—that “American families are in
general overinsured against health expenses,” and that “the current excess use of
health insurance produces a very substantial welfare loss.”100
More recently, a number of scholars—most prominently, John Nyman—have
challenged this account. Nyman argues that while health insurance may cause some
amount of excess utilization, most moral hazard is actually efficient because it
enables patients to access health care that they value highly but would not otherwise
be able to access, due to financial constraints.101 Under this view, the increased
utilization caused by obtaining health insurance “is not a distortion of the system; it
is just getting rid of the problem of the liquidity constraints that people face.”102
Nyman refers to this as “efficient moral hazard,”103 while Jonathan Gruber calls it
“an income or liquidity effect.”104
Nevertheless, concerns about moral hazard have proven quite influential over
the years.105 The theory of moral hazard has undergirded many health insurance
“innovations” in recent decades, including the proliferation of “cost-sharing” in
health insurance plans (in the form of deductibles, co-pays, co-insurance, etc.), the
advent of the “managed care” movement, and the introduction of health
savings accounts.106
2. Affecting Providers’ Treatment Behavior
The second way that expanding health insurance increases the demand for
health care is through changing the ways that providers deliver care. For most of
U.S. history, physicians operated as solo practitioners and practiced on a small scale
“because there were no substantial economies to be achieved in a large scale

99. Robin A. Cohen et. al., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Health Insurance Coverage
Trends, 1959-2007: Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, NAT’L HEALTH
STAT. REPORTS (2009).
100. Martin S. Feldstein, The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. ECON. 251,
251, 275 (1973).
101. See generally John A. Nyman, The Economics of Moral Hazard Revisited, 18 J. HEALTH
ECON. 811 (1999); John A. Nyman, The Value of Health Insurance: The Access Motive, 18 J. HEALTH
ECON. 141 (1999).
102. Jonathan Gruber, Commentary, in MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE 50 (2015).
103. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 98, at 103.
104. Gruber, supra note 102, at 49.
105. See Malcolm Gladwell, The Moral-Hazard Myth, NEW YORKER (Aug. 29, 2005), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/08/29/the-moral-hazard-myth [ https://perma.cc/C4622JZE ] (“[M]oral hazard has profoundly shaped the way think tanks formulate policy and the way
experts argue and the way health insurers structure their plans and the way legislation and regulations
have been written.”).
106. Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation, supra note 88, at 760.
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practice.”107 U.S. hospitals and health care facilities, which originated as religious or
charitable institutions, had long been organized as non-profit entities.108
Yet with first the growth of employer-sponsored health insurance and then
the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, a wave of money flooded the health care
system, precipitating a surge of new entrepreneurial ventures. Clark Havighurst
describes how Medicare in particular transformed the culture of health care:
Perhaps Medicare’s most significant side effect was to make the health care
sector an arena for profit-seeking activity more than ever before. For the
first time, hospitals and physicians could expect to be paid well for much
of the care they had previously provided for less. They also saw huge
increases in demand for even the costliest of their services. Entrepreneurs
suddenly saw new opportunities in health care, and physicians saw
opportunities to become entrepreneurs themselves.109
Between 1976 and 1982, the number of hospitals owned or managed by
for-profit organizations nearly doubled, even while the overall number of hospitals
decreased.110 In 1980, Arnold Relman, the then-editor of the New England Journal
of Medicine, published an article in the Journal decrying “the New Medical-Industrial
Complex,” and warning that physicians’ growing financial entanglements in the
health care system risked creating conflicts of interest and preventing them from
curbing over-utilization.111
These effects were compounded by the fact that Medicare employed the
traditional fee-for-service reimbursement model. In the decades following the
enactment of Medicare, fee-for-service reimbursement has been widely blamed for
encouraging providers to deliver those services that are most profitable, rather than
those which are most beneficial for patients, and for driving up overall health care
spending.112 Of course, many non-financial factors affect providers’ treatment
behavior as well, such as their education and training, potential legal liability, and
uncertainty about the proper course of treatment.113 Nevertheless, a substantial
107. Victor R. Fuchs, Can the Traditional Practice of Medicine Survive?, 125 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 154, 155 (1970).
108. Bradford H. Gray, An Introduction to the New Health Care for Profit, in THE NEW HEALTH
CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT 1, 7 (Bradford
H. Gray ed., 1983).
109. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, supra note 25, at 89; see also ROBERT
I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN AMERICA: COMPLEXITY, CONFRONTATION, AND
COMPROMISE 173 (2007) (“The driving force behind the commercial transformation of American
health care was the development of insurance.”).
110. Gray, supra note 108, at 2.
111. Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 963 (1980).
112. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, The Perfect Storm of Overutilization, 299 JAMA
2789, 2790 (2008). This phenomenon is often referred to as physician-induced demand or supplier-induced
demand. See generally EM Johnson, Physician-Induced Demand, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HEALTH
ECONOMICS 77 (Anthony J. Culyer ed., 2014). Jonathan Gruber refers to it as provider-side moral hazard.
Gruber, supra note 102, at 47–49.
113. See Lisa Rosenbaum, The Less-Is-More Crusade—Are We Overmedicalizing or
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body of empirical research finds that financial incentives do affect providers’
treatment decisions.114 For instance, one recent study found that on average, a two
percent increase in physician payment rates led to a three percent increase in the
provision of health care services.115
In an effort to curb excess demand, the ACA included several initiatives
designed to shift health insurance away from fee-for-service reimbursement and
toward reimbursing providers based on the extent to which they improve patients’
health (known as “value-based health care”).116 The law promoted a variety of new
payment models such as Accountable Care Organizations, which were explicitly
designed to “base payments on the results health care organizations and health care
professionals achieve for all of their patients’ care.”117 Nevertheless, for the time
being at least, fee-for-service remains the dominant provider payment method in
the United States.118
3. Encouraging the Development and Adoption of Technology
Finally, expanding health insurance coverage increases demand by changing
the course of technological development in medicine.119 The growth of medical
technology is thought to be one of the primary drivers of health care spending.120
Economists have argued that over time, expanding health insurance encourages
hospitals and medical centers to adopt expensive new technologies, and even
further on, incentivizes innovators to develop more such technologies in the first
place.121 For instance, there is evidence the enactment of Medicare led to the
adoption of open-heart surgery facilities and cardiac intensive care units.122 Once
again, fee-for-service reimbursement compounds these incentives by encouraging

Oversimplifying?, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2392, 2394 (2017); Lisa S. Rotenstein & Anupam B. Jena,
It’s Time to Rethink the Anatomy of Behavior, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 22, 2018), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180618.721948/full/ [ https://perma.cc/U3PP-WB92 ].
114. See Johnson, supra note 112 (summarizing the empirical evidence).
115. See Jeffrey Clemens & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Do Physicians’ Financial Incentives Affect Medical
Treatment and Patient Health, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1320 (2014).
116. See ECONOMIC RECORD, supra note 19, at 47–56.
117. Barack Obama, United States Health Care Reform: Progress to Date and Next Steps, 316
JAMA 525, 528 (2016).
118. Samuel H. Zuvekas & Joel W. Cohen, Fee-For-Service, While Much Maligned, Remains the
Dominant Payment Method for Physician Visits, 35 HEALTH AFF. 411, 411 (2016).
119. See, e.g., FINKELSTEIN, MORAL HAZARD IN HEALTH INSURANCE, supra note 92, at 36-40.
120. See Newhouse, supra note 96.
121. Sherry A. Glied, Health Insurance and Market Failure Since Arrow, in UNCERTAIN
TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 103, 107 (Peter
J. Hammer et al. eds., 2003).
122. Amy Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Introduction
of Medicare, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1, 26–29 (2007) [hereinafter Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of
Health Insurance].
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the adoption and development of costly new technologies, even if their benefits are
uncertain or marginal.123
Taking these long-term technological effects on the health care system into
account implies that health insurance has a much larger impact on the demand for
health care than its immediate incentive effects on patients and providers alone
would suggest.124 According to one estimate that tries to factor in these
technological effects, the spread of insurance between 1950 and 1990 can explain
roughly half of the increase in health care spending during this time.125
The story of technological development in medicine is not all negative. The
U.S. health insurance system has likely led to the development of some valuable
technologies, and likely also means that Americans are often the first ones to be
able to take advantage of new medical technologies.126 On the whole, however,
many economists believe that the way in which the United States’ insurance system
interacts with technology is inefficient, in that it causes excess expenditures on
unproductive medical technologies with uncertain benefits.127
B. Arrow’s “Feedback Loop” and Agenda-Setting
Through each of the channels described above, health insurance serves to
increase the demand for health care. As I will show in Part III, concerns about
health insurance leading to excess demand have in turn historically led regulators to
experiment with changes to delivery system regulations in order to stem any adverse
consequences on health care access, health care costs, and health care quality.
Kenneth Arrow appeared to foreshadow this relationship among health
insurance, increased demand for health care, and health care delivery laws, in his
classic 1963 article, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. The central
thesis of his article was that many of the distinctive nonmarket institutions present
in the health care system (such as medical licensing, physician codes of ethics, etc.)

123. Nicholas Bagley, Amitabh Chandra & Austin Frakt, Correcting Signals for Innovation in
Health Care, HAMILTON PROJECT 1, 10 (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/papers/
correcting_signals_for_innovation_in_health_care [ https://perma.cc/BG44-DTSN ] (“Perhaps the
primary explanation for high rates of inefficient use of medical technology is widespread use of
reimbursement methods that encourage a high volume of care without regard to its value.”). The
interactions between our health insurance system and the development and adoption of medical
technology are sometimes referred to as “dynamic moral hazard.” See, e.g., Peter Zweifel & Willard
G. Manning, Moral Hazard and Consumer Incentives in Health Care, in 1A THE HANDBOOK OF
HEALTH ECONOMICS 409, 413 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000).
124. See Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance, supra note 122, at 3 (estimating
that the introduction of Medicare is over six times what the RAND estimates would have predicted
based solely on changing patients’ incentives).
125. Id.
126. Amitabh Chandra & Jonathan Skinner, Technology Growth and Expenditure Growth in
Health Care, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 645, 647 (2012).
127. Katherine Baicker, Amitabh Chandra & Jonathan S. Skinner, Saving Money or Just Saving
Lives? Improving the Productivity of US Health Care Spending, 4 ANN. REV. ECON. 33, 46 (2012).
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arose in response to market failures, and in particular, to information asymmetries,
which he defined as “inequalities of information between the insurer on one hand
and the physician and patient on the other.”128
The relationship between health insurance and health care delivery laws can
be understood as part of this general relationship between market failures and
nonmarket institutions. Arrow theorized that the market will undersupply health
insurance on its own due to information asymmetries between insurers and
individuals, and thus advocated the government should step in to provide health
insurance.129 Yet Arrow presciently observed that “widespread medical insurance
increases the demand for medical care,”130 which in turn tends to lead to “market
forces . . . [being] replaced by direct institutional control.”131 Although it is unclear
exactly what Arrow had in mind by “direct institutional control,” that description
would seem to encompass health care delivery laws, such as Certificate of
Need restrictions.132
In sum, under Arrow’s account, the relationship between health care financing
laws and health care delivery laws is one manifestation of a broader feedback loop
in health care between market failures and government responses. The market’s
failure to provide health insurance to the public has necessitated
government-provided health insurance, which has increased the demand for health
care, which in turn has created pressure for the government to change delivery
system regulations.133
Why does increased demand for health care generate political pressure for
reforming delivery system laws? The account that follows suggests two main
reasons: First, policymakers have historically (and in some cases, justifiably) been
128.

Kenneth J. Arrow, Reflections on the Reflections, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW
CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE 321, 321 (Peter J. Hammer et al. eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Arrow, Reflections on the Reflections].
129. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, supra note 23, at 961.
130. Id. at 961.
131. Id. at 962.
132. Arrow made at least one other oblique reference to “direct controls” in a 2002 essay
reflecting on his original 1963 article and the responses it generated. See Arrow, Reflections on the
Reflections, supra note 128, at 321–22 (“The role of moral hazard in medical insurance arises from
inequalities of information between the insurer on one hand and the physician and patient on the other.
By itself, this phenomenon was well known in other kinds of insurance (where the term moral hazard
arose) and was met by various devices, such as deductibles and ceilings. Direct controls came later, as I
conjectured.”).
133. Others have described this dynamic in similar terms. See Glied, supra note 121, at 107
(“[T]he interplay between market failures, wherever they originate, and institutions that Arrow
described in 1963 continues now. Just as Arrow argued in 1963, each of these market failures has
generated its own set of institutional responses, and, in turn, these institutional responses have led to
further market failures.”); Michael Chernew, General Equilibrium and Marketability in the Health Care
Industry, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH
CARE 37, 37–38 (Peter J. Hammer et al. eds., 2003) (“The central thesis of this essay is that market and
nonmarket institutions have a symbiotic relationship, with nonmarket institutions serving to improve
resource allocation in areas where markets fail or do not exist.”).
AND THE
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concerned that—if left unaddressed—this increased demand will negate the
effectiveness of expanding health insurance in improving access to care, or,
exacerbate costs and quality problems. This account aligns with political scientist
John Kingdon’s emphasis on the role that “problem recognition”—or “[h]ow
people define something as a problem”—plays in determining which issues rise to
the top of policymakers’ agendas.134 Second, to the extent that health insurance
expansions are publicly financed, they render the cost of health care more visible
and urgent since it is now reflected in the government’s budget, rather than just in
individuals’ own balance sheets. This is again supported by the work of Kingdon,
who highlights budgetary considerations as playing an especially important role in
pushing health care issues to the top of the policymaking agenda.135
There are a couple distinctions between the account offered in this Article and
Arrow’s. First, Arrow does not explicitly acknowledge the notion of a dynamic
regulatory system. To the contrary, he later emphasized the path dependence of the
health care delivery laws, suggesting that he may have viewed the relationship
between insurance expansions and subsequent reforms as more of a one-off
cause-and-effect relationship.136 By contrast, I find that health insurance expansions
have created a system in which delivery system regulations are continually adjusting
and evolving.
Second, whereas Arrow theorized that the nonmarket institutions present in
health care “actually improved efficiency,”137 I do not assume that this is always the
case. For instance, I show how Medicare and Medicaid contributed to the enactment
of CON laws, which have been widely criticized in retrospect. Nevertheless, I argue
that the overall dynamism of health law—while not always leading to optimal
outcomes in every individual case—is on the whole normatively desirable.

134. KINGDON, supra note 24, at 90, 198.
135. Id. at 105–07.
136. See Arrow, Reflections on the Reflections, supra note 128, at 326 (“One type of explanation is
that history matters. At a formal level, the system is governed by dynamic relations, which have some
degree of instability, so that small variations can produce large and long-lasting deviations in outcome
after a while. The equations for predicting weather seem to be of this kind. One decision creates
enduring structures that are costly to change.”).
137. Id. at 323; see also Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, supra note
23, at 947 (“The doctrine that society will seek to achieve optimality by non-market means if it cannot
achieve them in the market is not novel. Certainly, the government, at least in its economic activities, is
usually implicitly or explicitly held to function as the agency which substitutes for the market’s failure.
I am arguing here that in some circumstances other social institutions will step into the optimality gap,
and that the medical-care industry, with its variety of special institutions, some ancient, some modern,
exemplifies this tendency.”); Chernew, supra note 133, at 39 (“In the absence of this rich set of markets,
Arrow contended that nonmarket institutions would develop so that resource allocation would come
closer to the competitive ideal than would otherwise occur if only the incomplete set of markets were
relied upon.”).
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III. HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY LAWS
This Section shows how the two most important health care financing laws in
U.S. history—the 1965 Medicare/Medicaid legislation and the 2010 Affordable
Care Act—influenced the three major areas of delivery system law outlined above
by increasing the demand for health care. This increased demand has tended to
exacerbate preexisting concerns about the “iron triangle” objectives of health care
policy: ensuring access, reducing costs, and improving quality.138 These concerns in
turn have generated political pressure to reform health care delivery system laws.
Importantly, these effects have not consistently been pro-regulatory or
deregulatory. Medicare and Medicaid contributed to the enactment of Certificate of
Need laws, but these programs (and to a lesser extent, the ACA) also contributed
to the curtailment of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and scope of
practice restrictions.
This Section focuses primarily on the impacts of Medicare and Medicaid, but
I highlight the ACA’s effects as well where relevant. Because the ACA’s main
coverage provisions only went into effect in 2014 and because these regulatory
changes play out slowly over many years, it seems likely that the ACA’s impacts will
grow over time. However, recent policy changes that have undermined the ACA’s
coverage expansion may make this less likely.139
A. Physician Shortages and the Curtailment of Scope of Practice Laws
The first way in which health insurance expansions have influenced health
care delivery laws is through accentuating concerns about the supply of health care
providers being insufficient to meet the rising demand for health care. In the 1950s
and 1960s, as more physicians began to leave general practice and enter specialized
medical fields, there was a growing perception of a shortage of primary
care physicians.140
During these decades, the government issued a series of reports warning that
“the health of American citizens was threatened by a physician shortage,”
compounded by a shortage of other health professionals.141 These reports called for
an expansion in medical education, and recommended that physicians delegate more
138. DAVID CUTLER, THE QUALITY CURE 1–2 (2014); see generally WILLIAM KISSICK,
MEDICINE’S DILEMMAS: INFINITE NEEDS VERSUS FINITE RESOURCES (1994) (introducing the
concept of the iron triangle and theorizing that these three objectives will inevitably be in tension with
one another).
139. Margot Sanger-Katz, After Falling Under Obama, America’s Uninsured Rate Looks to Be
Rising, N.Y. TIMES UPSHOT ( Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/upshot/rate-ofamericans-without-health-insurance-rising.html [ https://perma.cc/KHG3-4CAR ].
140. JULIE FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC: NURSE PRACTITIONERS AND THE
EVOLUTION OF MODERN HEALTH CARE 16 (2008) [hereinafter FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN
THE CLINIC].
141. Id.; see also STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 364.
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responsibilities to other health professions.142 In doing so, they “provided an
unintended opening and an avenue for other health professionals to broaden their
roles by taking on functions traditionally considered within the realm
of medicine.”143
The establishment of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965, and the accompanying
prospect of millions of elderly and poor individuals suddenly obtaining health
insurance and flooding health care facilities, lent greater urgency to these concerns.
In a 1966 interview with The New York Times, the president of the New York
Hospital-Cornell Medical Center blamed Congress for “enact[ing] legislation which
promises the American people health care without first anticipating the number of
doctors, nurses, hospital beds and other medical resources needed to accomplish
it,” calling the decision to expand health insurance without first expanding the
supply of health care providers “another example of the eccentric planning peculiar
to this country.”144 During this period, newspapers ran numerous other stories
deeming the shortage of health care providers a “crisis,” and focusing in particular
on Medicare’s role in increasing the demand for health care.145
Congress too was concerned that the enactment of Medicare would lead to a
shortage of providers. Shortly after the implementation of Medicare, the legal
counsel of one hospital in Nebraska warned the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare that with recent enactment of Medicare, “this Nation is faced
with the most critical shortage of nurses in its history.”146 These concerns persisted
in the years that followed, as signs of a shortage materialized. For instance, in 1971,
133 counties did not have an active physician, up from 98 counties in 1963.147
In response to these concerns, Congress passed the Allied Health Professions
Personnel Training Act, which provided additional funding and training for the
health care professions.148 The legislative history of the Act is replete with
expressions of concern that Medicare created a shortage of health care providers.
For example, in a speech on the House floor in support the Act, one member of
Congress underscored the imperative of training additional non-physician providers
to meet the rising demand stemming from Medicare:
142.
143.
144.

FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC, supra note 139, at 17.
Id.
Medicare Hobbled by Shortages, Says New York Hospital Chief, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1966,

at 13.
145. See, e.g., More Physicians Needed, N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1966, at 42; David Lawrence,
Medicare May Bring on Further Problems, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1965, at J6; Richard D. Lyons, Doctor Shortage
Nearing a Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1967, at 1; Cabell Phillips, Need for Nurses Called Critical,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1966, at 22; Harry Nelson, New Medical Programs Push Doctor Shortage to Crisis Point,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 5, 1965, § 7, at 1.
146. Health Professions Personnel, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emp’t and Manpower of the
Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 89th Cong. 326 (1966) (statement of Richard H. Hansen, Legal
Counsel, St. Elizabeth Hospital).
147. FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC, supra note 140, at 36.
148. Allied Health Professions Training Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-751, 80 Stat. 1222 (1966).
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As the House knows, I have long been a strong advocate of a health
program for the aged, but I would be the first to admit that the legislation
will be of little value unless we have sufficient facilities and personnel to
make health care available to all who need it. This is another reason why I
feel it is important that we not delay in establishing a program to train
students in the allied health professions. These paramedical people can take
a tremendous load off our doctors, dentists, and professional nurses and
enable them to treat more people more quickly and more effectively.149
These concerns in turn contributed to states’ scaling back scope of practice
restrictions on non-physician providers. In 1971, a special committee appointed by
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare called for broadening nurses’ roles
in health care delivery, citing the “increasing demand” for health care services.150
Others called for expanding the roles of physician assistants as well.151 That same
year, Idaho became the first state to authorize NPs to diagnose patients and
prescribe medications, subject to regulations promulgated by the medicine and
nursing boards.152 Thirty other states shortly followed suit.153
Over time, Richard Cooper and Linda Aiken write, “[l]icensure . . . shifted
from restricting entry to empowering a diverse array of NPCS [non-physician
clinicians] whose scope of practice overlaps that of physicians.”154 They attribute
this trend primarily to concerns about a physician shortage.155 Similarly, Ruth Elder
and Bonnie Bullough write, “[t]he major impetus behind the development of NPs
was a perceived shortage of physicians.”156

149.
150.

112 CONG. REC. 13,989 (1966).
U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE, EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF NURSING PRACTICE: A REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S
COMMITTEE TO STUDY EXTENDED ROLES FOR NURSES 4 (1971).
151. T. Elaine Adamson, Critical Issues in the Use of Physician Associates and Assistants, 61
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1765, 1765 (1971) (“The demand for medical services has been increasing rapidly,
especially since the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid . . . . Productivity of the medical care system
can be augmented . . . by the transfer of some of the physician’s tasks to physician associates and
physician assistants.”).
152. IDAHO CODE § 54-1413(e) (1971) (repealed by 1977 Idaho Sess. Laws 279); Barbara
J. Safriet, Health Care Dollars and Regulatory Sense: The Role of Advanced Practice Nursing, 9 YALE
J. ON REG. 417, 445 (1992) [hereinafter Safriet, Health Care Dollars and the Regulatory Sense].
153. Bonnie Bullough, The Law and the Expanding Nursing Role, 66 AJPH 249, 251 (1976)
[hereinafter Bullugh, The Law and the Expanding Nursing Role] (listing “30 states which have enacted
amendments to their nurse practice acts in the last five years to facilitate nurses taking on diagnostic
and treatment functions” and describing these developments as “moving so fast they have taken on an
almost revolutionary character”).
154. Richard A. Cooper & Linda H. Aiken, Human Inputs: The Health Care Workforce and
Medical Markets, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF
HEALTH CARE 71, 72 (Peter J. Hammer et al. eds., 2003).
155. Id. at 74 (“[T]he most powerful stimulus to their expansion was the perceived shortage of
primary care physicians and the ability of NPCs not only to provide the needed services, but also to
enhance the productivity of clinical teams.”).
156. Ruth G. Elder & Bonnie Bullough, Nurse Practitioners and Clinical Nurse Specialists: Are
the Roles Merging?, 4 CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALIST 78, 79 (1990). But see Diane O. McGivern,
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Of course, concerns about physician shortages predated Medicare and
Medicaid, and other factors played a role in the expansion of non-physician
providers as well, including organized activism by nurses and broader social
movements.157 Frances Porcher has argued that there was in fact no real shortage
of primary care providers, but rather that “[s]avvy nursing leaders exploited the
opportunity presented by the perception of a shortage of primary care to advance their
agenda to create expanded roles for nurses.”158
Nevertheless, the prospect of a looming physician shortage caused by millions
of people gaining health insurance played a contributing role in relaxing restrictions
on non-physician providers.159 Julie Fairman noted that “[t]he impact of federal

Environmental Factors Shaping Advanced Practice, in NURSE PRACTITIONERS: THE EVOLUTION AND
FUTURE OF ADVANCED PRACTICE 161, 161–62 (Eileen M. Sullivan-Marx et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010)
(“The drive behind advanced-practice role development and expansion is frequently presented in the
simplest terms. Most contemporary literature notes that the NP role arose solely to compensate for the
lack of physician services, giving credence to the view of NPs as substitutes or extenders, as opposed
to providers of both necessary and unique services. This linear connection between physician supply
and development of advanced practice from nursing . . . diminishes the powerful nursing dialogue that
guided NP role development and the strong holistic perspective that distinguishes NPs’ contribution
from medicine.”).
157. See, e.g., FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC, supra note 140, at 2–3; Julie
A. Fairman, Historic and Historical Opportunities: Nurse Practitioners and the Opportunities of Health
Reform, in NURSE PRACTITIONERS: THE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF ADVANCED PRACTICE 3, 6–7
(Eileen M. Sullivan-Marx et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010); Bullough, The Law and the Expanding Nursing Role,
supra note 153, at 249 (“Various factors have contributed to the need for this role expansion, including
the shortage of primary care physicians created by the shift away from primary to a specialty orientation
in medicine, the growing consumer demand for adequate health care, and, in some cases, such as the
coronary and intensive care units, the improved technology which has afforded new opportunities for
skilled nurses to save the lives of a significant number of patients.”).
158. Frances K. Porcher, Licensure, Certification, and Credentialing, in NURSE
PRACTITIONERS: EVOLUTION OF ADVANCED PRACTICE 415, 433 (Mathy D. Mezey et al. eds., 4th
ed. 2003) (emphasis added).
159. Ellen D. Baer, Philosophical and Historical Bases of Advanced Practice Nursing Roles, in
NURSE PRACTITIONERS: EVOLUTION OF ADVANCED PRACTICE 37, 38 (Mathy D. Mezey
et al. eds., 4th ed. 2003) (“The passage of Medicare/Medicaid legislation in 1965 created an expanded
demand for health services. The supply and distribution of primary care physicians was unable to meet
this demand. In addition, the services demanded were broader in scope than those contained within the
domain of medicine prior to the 1960s . . . . The nursing profession stepped into the breach.”);
ELISABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS 72 (2017) (“The use of physician extenders in the
United States has its roots in the late 1960s and early 1970s. There was a perceived shortage of doctors,
particularly in the area of primary care, as many more Americans got insurance and more doctors trained
as specialists.”); Tine Hansen-Turton, Jamie Ware & Frank McClellan, Nurse Practitioners in Primary
Care, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1235, 1242 (2010) (“The opportunities for nurses in primary care grew again in
the 1960s as the country experienced a physician shortage following the adoption of the Medicare and
Medicaid programs in 1965, which spurred greater demand on the health care system than before.”);
John Michael O’Brien, How Nurse Practitioners Obtained Provider Status: Lessons for Pharmacists, 60
AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 2301, 2032 (2003) (“In 1965, the Medicare and Medicaid programs
provided health care coverage to low-income women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities.
The sudden availability of coverage increased the demand for expanded primary care services. Because
physicians were unable to meet this demand, nurses ‘stepped into the breach.’”); Safriet, Health Care
Dollars and Regulatory Sense, supra note 152, at 444 (observing that several events contributed to the
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funding on the nurse practitioner movement cannot be forgotten,” and emphasized
in particular the role that Medicare played:
Grounded by generous federal funding for health professional education
(the Training Acts of the early 1960s), this movement gained impetus
through the changes wrought by Medicare (1966) and the state-federal
partnership of Medicaid (in the late 1960s). These new federal and state
entitlement programs came at a time when physicians increasingly
specialized and the number of those providing general medical care
declined, creating shortages in poor urban and rural communities.
Medicare and Medicaid created access to acute and specialty medical care,
which is where the bulk of the demand for health care resided. It increased
the number and type of patients receiving health care services without
substantially changing the system of health delivery . . . . With these
changes came transformations in how physicians and nurses were
educated, paid, and where and how they practiced.160
More recently, the Affordable Care Act contributed to further easing scope of
practice restrictions for non-physician providers. Once again, forecasts of tens of
millions of individuals gaining health insurance amplified concerns about a
physician shortage.161 In 2010, the year the ACA was signed into law, the
Association of American Medical Colleges released a study predicting a shortage of
63,000 doctors by 2015, with the ACA alone expected to be responsible for half
that shortage.162
Prominent media outlets published stories with ominous headlines, such as
“Doctor Shortage Likely to Worsen with Health Law,”163 “Doctor Shortage,
Increased Demand Could Crash Health Care System,”164 “Thanks to Obamacare,

expansion of nursing in the mid-1960s, including the introduction of Medicaid and Medicare and the
looming shortage of physicians).
160. FAIRMAN, MAKING ROOM IN THE CLINIC, supra note 140, at 3.
161. See, e.g., Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, supra note 65, at 63 (“Policymakers’ greatest
immediate concern is a coming ‘doc shortage,’ especially a shortage of primary-care physicians, who
were in short supply even before the ACA’s enactment.”); Peter D. Jacobson & Shelley A. Jazowski,
Physicians, the Affordable Care Act, and Primary Care: Disruptive Change or Business As Usual?, 26
J. GEN. INT. MED. 934, 934 (2011) (“With expanded access to primary care for millions of new patients,
physicians and policymakers face increased pressure to solve the perennial shortage of primary care
practitioners.”).
162. AAMC Releases New Physician Shortage Estimates Post-Reform, AAMC (Sept. 30,
2010), https://www.aamc.org/newsroom/newsreleases/2010/150570/100930.html [ https://
perma.cc/H6W2-G5F9 ].
163. Annie Lowrey & Robert Pear, Doctor Shortage Likely to Worsen with Health Law,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2012, at A1.
164. Jen Christensen, Doctor Shortage, Increased Demand Could Crash Health Care System, CNN
(Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/02/health/obamacare-doctor-shortage/index.html
[ https://perma.cc/64RH-CSYB ].
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A 20,000 Doctor Shortage Is Set to Quintuple,”165 and “Why the Doctor Can’t See
You.”166 One CNN story quoted a doctor who darkly compared the ACA to “giving
everyone an ATM card in a town where there are no ATM machines.”167 Some
news reports observed that Massachusetts had experienced lengthy wait times for
doctors’ appointments after passing its own health care reform law in 2006, a law
which served a model for the ACA.168
These concerns prompted numerous calls for expanding non-physician
providers’ scopes of practice. Professional groups such as the American Association
of Nurse Practitioners seized on the ACA as a reason in favor of loosening scope
of practice restrictions.169 The National Governors Association advocated that
states “reexamine their scope of practice laws governing nurse practitioners,” in part
to meet the rising demand for health care due to the ACA.170 In his 2013 testimony
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions
(HELP), Uwe Reinhardt argued in favor of developing a national scope of practice
regime that “reflect[s] the expertise of both . . . physicians and
nurse practitioners.”171
Other related factors played a role as well. For instance, the ACA itself
included some specific provisions that further encouraged reliance on NPs,
including additional funding for nurse training and nurse-managed clinics.172
Perhaps most notably, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published an influential
report in 2011 which recommended, among other things, that states reform their
scope of practice laws to allow APNs “to practice to the full extent of their

165. Sally Pipes, Thanks to Obamacare, A 20,000 Doctor Shortage Is Set to Quintuple, FORBES
( June 10, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sallypipes/2013/06/10/thanks-to-obamacare-a20000-doctor-shortage-is-set-to-quintuple/#4658ec22322e [ https://perma.cc/22XR-K43K ].
166. John C. Goodman, Why the Doctor Can’t See You, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 14, 2012), https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443404004577578980699719356 [ https://perma.cc/
6U94-9R8G ].
167. Christensen, supra note 164.
168. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 165; National Health Preview, WALL ST. J. (May 10,
2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703864204576313370527615288 [https://
perma.cc/S8TC-52XK].
169. Sarah Kliff, Obamacare Is Ramping Up a Health-Care Turf War, WASH. POST WONKBLOG
(Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/02/27/how-obamacareis-ramping-up-a-health-care-turf-war/ [ https://perma.cc/SMD3-FNM5 ] (“In Washington, D.C., and
in state houses, the American Association of Nurse Practitioners is making the case that it’s time to
broaden the scope of practice laws — and that the Affordable Care Act significantly strengthens their
case.”).
170. The Role of Nurse Practitioners in Meeting Increasing Demand for Primary Care,
NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (2012), https://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/
1212NursePractitionersPaper.pdf [ https://perma.cc/3C2D-SZLV ].
171. 30 Million New Patients and 11 Months to Go: Who Will Provide Their Primary
Care: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Primary Health and Aging of the H. Comm. On Health, Educ.,
Labor & Pensions, 113th Cong. 39 (2013) (statement of Uwe E. Reinhardt, Princeton University).
172. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §§ 5202, 5208, 124
Stat. 119, 607 (2010).
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education and training.”173 The IOM report specifically noted that the ACA
rendered it more urgent to expand nurses’ scope of practice, warning that “overly
restrictive scope-of-practice regulations” for APNs pose a “serious barrier” to care
for the millions of people gaining coverage under the ACA.174
Once again, partly in response to these pressures, states loosened their scope
of practice restrictions for non-physicians, such as NPs and Physician Assistants.175
Since the beginning of 2010, the year the Affordable Care Act was signed into law,
ten states have expanded their scope of practice regimes for NPs to “Full Practice,”
bringing the total number to twenty-two states and DC (as of June 2017).176
According to one study, nearly 1800 state laws relating to scope of practice
restrictions were proposed between 2011 and 2012, of which 350 were adopted.177
Again, not all of these changes can be attributed to the ACA, but it played a
contributing role.178 One article published in 2010 reported that twenty-eight states
were considering expanding NPs’ scope of practice after the ACA’s passage, and
provocatively speculated, “[a] nurse may soon be your doctor.”179 State legislators
in Nevada and Connecticut explicitly invoked the ACA’s insurance expansion

173. INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH
278 (2011).
174. Id. at 85–86, 96.
175. Matt Brothers, The PPACA’s Impact on the Scope of Practice of Nurse Practitioners, 23
ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 79, 83 (2013) (“The passage of the PPACA already led to
a flurry of state legislation regarding nurse practitioners. Much of this legislation is designed to ease
restrictions on the scope of practice of nurse practitioners.”).
176. Email from Michelle L. Cook, Vice President of Research, Am. Ass’n of Nurse
Practitioners, to author ( June 23, 2017) (on file with author). The American Association of Nurse
Practitioners defines “Full Practice” as follows: “[s]tate practice and licensure laws permit all [nurse
practitioners] to evaluate patients; diagnose, order and interpret diagnostic tests; and initiate and manage
treatments, including prescribing medications and controlled substances, under the exclusive licensure
authority of the state board of nursing.” State Practice Environment, AM. ASS’N NURSE PRACTITIONERS,
https://www.aanp.org/legislation-regulation/state-legislation/state-practice-environment [ https://
perma.cc/2G7F-WNR3 ] ( last updated Dec. 20, 2018 ).
177. Catherine Dower, Jean Moore & Margaret Langelier, It Is Time to Restructure Health
Professions Scope-Of-Practice Regulations to Remove Barriers to Care, 32(11) HEALTH AFF. 1971, 1971
(2013) (citing Scope of Practice Legislative Database, 2011–2013, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEG.’S,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/scope-of-practice-legislation-tracking-database.aspx); see
Adams & Markowitz, supra note 37 (“The current trend is toward more provider
independence—known as fully authorized SOP—and fewer restrictions on practice (appendix figures
1–3). For example, the number of states allowing completely independent practice and prescribing
authority for CNMs more than tripled from 9 to 29 between 1994 and 2017 (Markowitz et al. 2017;
authors’ calculations).”).
178. See Johnson, supra note 9, at 504 (“The great concern over the shortage of primary care
physicians to meet these goals is . . . fostering a push to expand practice opportunities for [APNs
and PAs].”).
179. Carla K. Johnson, Doctor Shortage? 28 States May Expand Nurses’ Role, MED. EXPRESS
(Apr. 13, 2010), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2010-04-doctor-shortage-states-nurses-role.html
[ https://perma.cc/G924-8WXL ].
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during the lead-up to passing laws expanding NPs’ scope of practice.180 Similarly, in
2014, former Governor Steve Beshear of Kentucky explicitly linked the passage of
a bill expanding NPs’ prescribing authority with concerns about the ACA causing a
shortage of primary care physicians.181 Beshear later attested that although he
believed that loosening scope of practice restrictions was warranted irrespective of
whether the ACA had been enacted, his state would not have implemented changes
to its scope of practice laws had it not been for the new health care law.182
B. The HMO Act and the Erosion of the Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine
Medicaid and Medicare also played a crucial—though less direct—role in the
erosion of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. Health care spending growth
continued unabated into the early 1970s, driven by cost growth for outpatient
hospital services.183 Labor leaders and Democrats, led by Senator Edward Kennedy,
increasingly pushed to enact a national health insurance program, and Kennedy
released a report aimed at building support for his initiative titled “The Health Care
Crisis in America.”184
Only a few months after he took office in 1969, President Richard Nixon
echoed this language, warning that the health care system faced a “massive crisis”
stemming from “massively increasing demands in this field,” and that “unless action

180. MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE ASSEMB. COMM. ON COMMERCE & LABOR, 77th
Sess. (Nev. Feb. 27, 2013), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Minutes/Assembly/CL/
Final/326.pdf [ https://perma.cc/V5VF-4T59 ]; MINUTES OF THE S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, LABOR
& ENERGY, 77th Sess. (Nev. May 1, 2013), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/77th2013/Minutes/
Senate/CL/Final/1042.pdf [ https://perma.cc/4LRF-LHXB ]; MINUTES OF THE S. COMM. ON
COMMERCE, LABOR & ENERGY, 77th Sess. (Nev. May 17, 2013), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/
77th2013/Minutes/Senate/CL/Final/1208.pdf [ https://perma.cc/TK66-RWY6 ]; Arielle Levin
Becker, Senate Votes to Allow Nurse Practitioners to Practice Independent of Doctors, CT MIRROR
(Apr. 9, 2014), https://ctmirror.org/2014/04/09/senate-votes-to-allow-nurse-practitioners-topractice-independent-of-doctors/ [ https://perma.cc/6HJA-ZHXU ].
181. Anna Hartkeymeyer, Kentucky Broadens the Scope of Practice for Nurse Practitioners,
COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS. ( July 25, 2014), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/kentuckybroadens-scope-practice-nurse-practitioners [ https://perma.cc/S3VQ-HDBG ] (“‘As more people
gain access to health care as a result of the Affordable Care Act, this bill is a step in the right direction
to begin addressing the current and projected shortfall of primary care physicians in Kentucky,’ said
Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear in a press release following the signing of Senate Bill 7.”).
182. UNIV. OF PA. LEONARD DAVIS INST. OF HEALTH ECONS., LDI HEALTH POLICY
SEMINAR WITH STEVE BESHEAR, JD: PEOPLE OVER POLITICS: THE SOLUTION TO OUR
HEALTHCARE LOGJAM (2018).
183. AARON C. CATLIN & CATHY A. COWAN, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES, HISTORY OF HEALTH SPENDING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960–2013, at 9–10 (2015),
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/
NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/HistoricalNHEPaper.pdf [ https://perma.cc/37MYBGHD ].
184. Jennifer Evans & Jaclyn Schiff, A Timeline of Kennedy’s Health Care Achievements and
Disappointments, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 17, 2010), https://khn.org/news/kennedy-healthcare-timeline/ [ https://perma.cc/PB5M-2WD5 ]; see also PAUL STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION
52–53 (2011).
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is taken . . . we will have a breakdown in our medical care system which could have
consequences affecting millions of people throughout this country.”185 Soon, the
Nixon Administration began “casting about for a solution to the rising and
seemingly uncontrollable costs of the Medicare and Medicaid programs that had
helped to generate a climate of health care crisis that was troubling the Congress.”186
As luck would have it, Thomas Joe, then a top assistant to John Veneman, the
Under Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW),
reportedly encountered Dr. Paul Ellwood on a plane, where the latter reportedly
sold him on the concept of “health maintenance organizations” (HMOs),187 hybrid
health care organizations that both treat patients and offer insurance coverage in
exchange for a fixed annual fee per patient.188 Ellwood, a pediatric neurologist and
the founder of a Minneapolis-based think tank, is credited with coining and
popularizing the term HMO,189 though such organizations—also referred to as
prepaid group plans—date as far back as the 1930s.190
Only a couple weeks after the fateful plane ride, Ellwood submitted a memo
to the White House making the case for a “Health Maintenance Strategy,” just in
advance of a meeting between high-level White House officials and HEW
officials.191 Ellwood envisioned that HMOs would offer comprehensive care to
patients in exchange for prepayment, and compete against each other and against
traditional plans based on price and quality.192 Ellwood painted HMOs as a
market-based alternative to enacting more regulations on health care services, an
option that the Nixon Administration viewed as unpalatable.193
The Administration proved receptive to Ellwood’s arguments, and in 1971,
President Nixon made HMOs a central element of his “National Health
Strategy.”194 Congress and the Administration were under pressure to curb rising

185. President Richard Nixon, Remarks at a Briefing on the Nation’s Health System,
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (July 10, 1969), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarksbriefing-the-nations-health-system [ https://perma.cc/82LU-HJN9 ].
186. Patricia Bauman, The Formation and Evolution of the Health Maintenance Organization
Policy, 1970-1973, 10 SOC. SCI. & MED. 129, 130 (1976).
187. KINGDON, supra note 24, at 6.
188. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost
Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 436–37 (1988).
189. Clark C. Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services,
35 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 716, 718–19 (1970).
190. STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 184, at 54.
191. Bauman, supra note 186, at 130–31.
192. CARL F. AMERINGER, THE HEALTH CARE REVOLUTION: FROM MEDICAL MONOPOLY
TO MARKET COMPETITION 64 (2008).
193. Paul M. Ellwood, Jr. et al., Health Maintenance Strategy, 9 MED. CARE 291, 295 (1971)
(“The health maintenance policy is expected to substantially lessen the Federal government’s role in the
planning and management of health programs, and therefore, should not be regarded as ‘just another
Federal health program.’”).
194. President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Proposing a National Health
Strategy (Feb. 18, 1971), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
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health care costs, and a Presidential Commission had recently expressed support for
prepaid practice as a promising organizational innovation to slow health care
spending.195 Nixon himself was familiar with the most successful prepaid group
plan, Kaiser Permanente, which was then the largest health care organization
in California.196
Importantly, both Ellwood and Nixon explicitly argued that Medicare and
Medicaid had rendered the HMO Act necessary by increasing the demand for health
care without simultaneously reforming the health care delivery system. Ellwood’s
memo (a version of which was later published as an academic paper) blamed
Medicare and Medicaid for increasing demand and cautioned against further
expanding health insurance, warning that it would inexorably lead to
more regulations.197
Similarly, in President Nixon’s eyes, the HMO Act was a necessary response
to Medicare and Medicaid, which had increased the demand for health care and
spurred rising health care costs. In a 1972 speech advocating for his “National
Health Strategy,” Nixon traced the necessity of the HMO Act back to Medicare
and Medicaid:
One basic shortcoming of a solution to health care problems which
depends entirely on spending more money, can be seen in the Medicare
and Medicaid programs. Medicare and Medicaid did deliver needed dollars
to the health care problems of the elderly and the poor. But at the same
time, little was done to alter the existing supply and distribution of doctors,
nurses, hospitals and other health resources. Our health care supply, in
short, remained largely the same while massive new demands were loaded
onto it. The predictable result was acute price inflation, one basic cause of
our health economic quandary of the past 11 years . . . . If we do not lessen
this trend, all other reform efforts may be in vain.198
In 1973, Congress passed the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act
to encourage the development of HMOs.199 The law promoted HMOs in several
special-message-the-congress-proposing-national-health-strategy [ https://perma.cc/7FJV-DU6X ]
[hereinafter Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Proposing a National Health Strategy].
195. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HEALTH MANPOWER: REPORT 66–68 (1967)
(noting that Kaiser has lower hospital and outpatient utilization and costs than the rest of the United
States).
196. STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION, supra note 184, at 54–55.
197. Ellwood, Jr. et al., supra note 193, at 291.
198. President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Health Care (Mar. 2, 1972),
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-thecongress-health-care [ https://perma.cc/JZF9-GEHY ] [hereinafter Nixon, Special Message to the
Congress on Healthcare]; see also Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Proposing a National Health
Strategy, supra note 194 (“It does little good . . . to increase the demand for care unless we also increase
the supply . . . . This axiom was ignored when Medicaid and Medicare were created-and the nation paid
a high price for that error. The expectations of many beneficiaries were not met and a severe inflation
in medical costs was compounded.”).
199. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2018).
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ways, including providing grants and loans to develop and operate HMOs and
requiring large businesses to offer an HMO in their benefit plan if possible.200 At
the same time, it also required HMOs to meet certain conditions to be eligible for
funding, such as offering a more generous set of benefits and not discriminating
based on health status.201
Most importantly for purposes of this Article, the law also promoted HMOs
by undermining the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. The corporate practice
prohibition could be invoked to prohibit HMOs, especially for-profit ones.202 At
the time that the HMO Act was being debated in Congress, proponents of HMOs
viewed the corporate practice of medicine doctrine as one of the major barriers to
the development of HMOs.203
The need for addressing the corporate practice doctrine was cited as part of
the reason for enacting the HMO Act,204 and an early version of the Act explicitly
preempted the corporate practice prohibition, at least as it applied to non-profit
HMOs.205 Although the final version of the Act did not ultimately go that far, it
made clear that any application of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine to
prohibit the development of HMOs would be preempted.206 According to George
Harris and Derek Foran, “[t]he HMO Act was instrumental in breaking down the
barriers to corporate ownership of medical service providers.”207

200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-4, -9 (2018).
201. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 401.
202. Robert T. Holley & Rick J. Carlson, The Legal Context for the Development of Health
Maintenance Organizations, 24 STAN. L. REV. 644, 657–58 (1972) (“[I]t is clear that a majority of courts
feels that the furnishing of medical care through a corporate structure is undesirable, and condemns
organizations on that basis alone. Since HMOs are corporations, the rule will probably be applied to
them.”); Philip C. Kissam & Ronald M. Johnson, Health Maintenance Organizations and Federal
Law: Toward a Theory of Limited Reformmongering, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1163, 1184 (1976) (“All HMOs,
particularly profitmaking ones, may be prohibited by application of the hoary, but occasionally viable,
common law rule against the corporate practice of medicine.”); Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice
in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARV. L. REV. 887, 960 (1977) (“The common law rule that a
corporation cannot engage in a ‘learned calling’ would appear, on its face, to bar incorporated prepaid
group practice.”).
203. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46, at 481; Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 277.
204. Huberfeld, supra note 14, at 277.
205. The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, supra note 202, at
962 n.52 (“The proposed Health Security Act . . . would eliminate the corporate practice rule for
nonprofit participating organizations, provided an administrative board finds the arrangements are not
likely to cause lay interference with professional acts or professional judgments.”).
206. Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46, at 482 (“[A]ny application of the prohibition would conflict
with the legislation so directly that preemption would appear certain.”); Kissam & Johnson, supra note
202, at 1218 (“By implication the Act also preempts the application to qualified HMOs of the common
law rule against the corporate practice of medicine.”).
207. George C. Harris & Derek F. Foran, The Ethics of Middle-Class Access to Legal Services
and What We Can Learn from the Medical Profession’s Shift to a Corporate Paradigm, 70 FORDHAM
L. REV. 775, 814 (2001); see also Saver, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 674 (“The federal HMO Act
of 1973 is credited with jump-starting managed care and promoting HMOs as a viable alternative in the
private market. It did so by preempting obstructive state laws for federally qualified HMOs and
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Through the financial inducements it provided and these regulatory
curtailments, the Act contributed to a dramatic expansion in HMOs across the
country.208 Following the HMO Act, almost all of the states went further and
specifically exempted HMOs from their corporate practice of medicine laws.209
Although the Act’s regulatory requirements initially limited its effectiveness,210
enrollment in HMOs doubled in the first half of the 1970s, and continued to grow
throughout the late 1970s and through the 1980s.211
Thus, by increasing demand for health care and spurring health care cost
growth, Medicare and Medicaid led to the enactment of the HMO Act, which in
turn contributed to the erosion of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. The
end result is that while corporate practice prohibitions remain “legal landmines,”
they are far less potent than they used to be.212
C. The Health Costs Crisis and the Rise of Certificate of Need Laws
The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid also contributed to the expansion
of CON laws, through increasing the demand for health care and driving up
government expenditures on health care. With the implementation of these new
programs in 1966, millions of elderly and poor Americans gained health insurance
coverage for the first time. That year alone, 18.9 million people enrolled in Medicare
Part A (covering hospital services and nursing home care), 17.6 million enrolled in
Medicare Part B (covering physician and other services), and 4 million enrolled in
Medicaid.213 As more states implemented Medicaid, enrollment swelled to 17
million by 1973, while Medicare enrollment inched upwards to 23.1
million enrollees.214
As referenced above, Medicare’s reimbursement structure also further
increased the demand for health care. Initially, Medicare reimbursed physicians and
hospitals on a retrospective fee-for-service basis (i.e., physicians and hospitals were
reimbursed for whatever they spent), as long as their costs were “reasonable”215
—a determination which was effectively left to the hospitals and physicians

requiring certain employers to offer an HMO option as part of the health benefits available to
employees in order to obtain favorable tax treatment for employee health expenses.”).
208. Harris & Foran, supra note 207, at 817.
209. Sara D. Mars, The Corporate Practice of Medicine: A Call for Action, HEALTH MATRIX 241,
260 (1997).
210. Gail B. Agrawal & Howard R. Veit, Back to the Future: The Managed Care Revolution, 65
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 32 (2002) (“The implementation of the HMO Act sputtered for several
years after its enactment, due partly to the Act’s burdensome requirements and partly to bureaucratic
mismanagement.”).
211. Lynn R. Gruber, Maureen Shadle & Cynthia L. Polich, From Movement to Industry: The
Growth of HMOs, HEALTH AFF. 197, 198 (1988).
212. See Rosoff, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
213. CATLIN & COWAN, supra note 183, at 9.
214. Id.
215. Medicare Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 102(a), § 1814(b), 79 Stat. 286, 296.
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themselves.216 The regulations interpreting these provisions permitted hospitals to
seek reimbursement for costs associated with directly providing patient care, as well
as for “capital costs” (e.g., interest on debt, depreciation).217
These developments soon led to spiraling health expenditures. Medicare’s
reimbursement structure sparked a “medical arms race,” as hospitals competed
based on who could adopt the latest costly new medical technology.218 Health care
spending grew at an annual rate of 11.9% from 1966 through 1973, up from its
8.9% rate from 1960 to 1965.219 The pace of health care price growth too began to
accelerate, rising by 5.1% from 1966 to 1973.220 One estimate finds that Medicare
alone was responsible for increasing hospital spending by nearly 40% between 1965
and 1970.221 These trends were met with alarm. Christy Chapin observes that
“[a]fter 1965, voters and policymakers discussed health care using terms customarily
reserved for national catastrophes.”222
Rising government expenditures stemming from Medicare (a federal program)
and Medicaid (a joint federal-state program) placed growing budgetary pressure on
both the federal government and the states. Between 1966 and 1967, the
government’s share of health care spending increased from 24% to 29%.223
Medicare expenditures alone reached $10.7 billion in 1973,224 while Medicaid
spending reached $6.5 billion by 1971.225
To stem these rising costs, state and federal policymakers implemented a raft
of new regulations on physicians and hospitals to curb health care spending, the
“chief manifestation” of which were Certificate of Need (CON) laws.226 CON laws
varied in their structure and approach, but they generally required that the
government certify that there was an existing health need before allowing new

216. Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats, supra note 20, at 527.
217. See generally Eleanor D. Kinney & Bonnie Lefkowitz, Capital Cost Reimbursement to
Community Hospitals Under Federal Health Insurance Programs, 7 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 648,
649 (1982).
218. JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 23–25 (1999); see also
Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, supra note 25, at 86 (“The uncontrolled moral hazard
inherent in these financing arrangements eventually gave rise to unprecedented cost escalation, as
benefit/cost ratios were almost totally neglected in physicians’ clinical choices and, consequently, also
in decision making on capital spending and technological development.”).
219. CATLIN & COWAN, supra note 183, at 8.
220. Id. at 10.
221. Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance, supra note 122.
222. CHAPIN, supra note 45, at 234.
223. CATLIN & COWAN, supra note 183, at 11.
224. Id. at 9.
225. John D. Klemm, Medicaid Spending: A Brief History, 22 HEALTH CARE FINANCING
REV. 105, 106 (2000).
226. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by “Certificate of Need,” supra note
70, at 1143.
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health care facilities to enter the market or existing facilities to make large capital
investments.227
Soon after the implementation of Medicaid and Medicare, CON laws began
to proliferate. In 1964, just one year before the passage of Medicare and Medicaid,
New York became the first state to enact its own CON law in response to rising
hospital costs.228 Yet it was only after the implementation of Medicaid placed
growing fiscal pressures on state governments that other states followed suit.229 In
part responding to this pressure, by 1972, twenty states had adopted their own CON
laws.230
The federal government too turned to CON laws to stem rising health care
spending. In 1966, Congress passed the Comprehensive Health Planning and
Services Act, which provided funding for state and local agencies to coordinate their
planning activities and to provide broader access to health care.231 In 1972, Congress
built on this momentum by passing legislation giving the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare the authority to deny Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement
for health care facilities’ capital expenditures if the state had not certified them as
meeting a community need.232 This latter legislation was explicitly designed to
address the perverse incentives created by Medicare and Medicaid’s
open-ended reimbursement provision for capital expenditures.233
In 1974, Congress passed the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act (NHPRDA), which offered funding to state CON programs and
required them to meet federal standards or else forgo eligibility for Medicare and
Medicaid.234 Like the previous federal planning statutes, the NHPRDA was largely
intended to address mounting health care spending, which was in turn driven by
Medicare and Medicaid.235

227. Simpson, supra note 64, at 1025
228. Payton & Powsner, supra note 66, at 209–10.
229. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 398 (“Impelled by rising costs, state
governments led the way toward stiffer regulation of the health care industry. New York in 1964 had
been the first state to regulate capital expenditures of hospitals and nursing homes, but few followed
its example until soaring Medicaid expenditures at the end of the decade obliged state legislatures to
take action.”).
230. Id.
231. Comprehensive Health Planning and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 246 (1966).
232. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–603, § 221, 86 Stat. 1329, 1386
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §1320a-1 (2014)); Simpson, supra note 64, at 1038.
233. Simpson, supra note 64, at 1038 (“The Social Security Amendments of 1972 contained
several measures designed to restrain Medicare and Medicaid program cost increases caused by
incurred-cost reimbursement.”).
234. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–641,
88 Stat. 2225 (1975)
235. Id. (“The massive infusion of Federal funds into the existing health care system has
contributed to inflationary increases in the cost of health care . . . . Increases in the cost of health care,
particularly of hospital stays, have been uncontrollable and inflationary.”).
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Again, of course, there were multiple forces responsible for the proliferation
of CON laws. For instance, larger hospitals found CON laws appealing as a means
of forestalling more serious government regulation and reducing competition.236
The “legitimacy of professional dominance” that had long existed in health care
began to erode.237 CON laws also built on a tradition of “health planning” initiatives
that Congress had previously endorsed by enacting the 1946 Hill Burton Act.238
Nevertheless, Medicaid and Medicare played a decisive role by triggering
spiraling health expenditures and drastically increasing the government’s share of
the burden. Sallyanne Payton and Rhoda Powsner have written that the
implementation of Medicare and Medicaid represented “a watershed in the
developing relationship between government and the hospitals.”239 Whereas
previously, “government had been a bystander in what was principally a private
sector problem,” Medicare and Medicaid precipitated “the need and the desire to
act, driven by [the government’s] own self-interest as a major purchaser of medical
services . . . in containing its own financial liabilities.”240 Paul Starr offers a similar
assessment, writing that the “distinctive factor” that explains the “growing health
care regulation of the 1970s” is “that a large share of medical costs had been
socialized . . . [and that] [g]overnment[s], employers, and commercial insurers
balked at both the rise in costs and the uncertainty that inflation created
for them.”241
Some readers may view this account of the rise of CON laws as a cautionary
tale, since CON laws subsequently fell out of favor and have been roundly criticized
as ineffectual and anti-competitive.242 Their emergence in the aftermath of Medicare
and Medicaid may illustrate the responsiveness of the delivery system to changes in
health insurance, but it also shows that the delivery system reforms that result from
this process are not guaranteed to be successful.
More recently, however, some scholars have concluded that the problem with
CON laws was not that they were enacted in the first place, but rather that they did
not go far enough, for example, by giving regulators the authority to control hospital
prices.243 In recent years, more health law scholars have begun to advocate for
reinstituting economic regulation of the health care sector, and more specifically,
for regulating health care prices.244 Thus, even if CON laws did not have their

236. See Payton & Powsner, supra note 66.
237. ROBINSON, supra note 218, at 30.
238. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by “Certificate of Need,” supra note
70, at 1148.
239. Payton & Powsner, supra note 66, at 259.
240. Id. at 259–60.
241. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 24, at 403.
242. See supra Part I.C.
243. HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 56, at 1225.
244. See, e.g., TRACY YEE ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, RESEARCH BRIEF
NO. 4, HEALTH CARE CERTIFICATE-OF-NEED LAWS: POLICY OR POLITICS? 1 (2011) (“As health care
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intended effect, they still represented a defensible policy response to the problem
of rising health care costs.
*

*

*

To review, health care financing laws have played a central role in shaping the
landscape of health care delivery laws through shifting the public’s demand for
health care. The enactment of Medicaid and Medicare—and to a lesser extent, the
ACA—increased the demand for health care through at least three
channels: increasing access to health care; encouraging providers to deliver
additional services; and creating incentives that encouraged the development and
proliferation of expensive new technologies over time. The resulting increase in
demand in turn exacerbated concerns about reduced access to health care and rising
health care costs (and in particular government expenditures on health care), which
in turn caused regulators to enact new regulations—or change existing ones—in
order to address these problems.
These forces have helped to shape the landscape of health care delivery laws
today. Out of the three areas of health care delivery law outlined in this Article, two
(the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and scope of practice restrictions)
predated the widespread availability of health insurance and have been substantially
weakened by the expansions of insurance under Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA,
whereas the origins of the remaining one (Certificate of Need laws) can be traced
back to the expansion of health insurance under Medicare and Medicaid.
To be sure, health care financing laws are not the only forces responsible for
these changes in health care delivery laws. For instance, other factors besides the
HMO Act, such as the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision that upheld a Federal Trade
Commission order finding the AMA’s ethical codes in violation of federal antitrust
laws, contributed to the erosion of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine.245
More generally, as Louise Trubek has emphasized in her work on the New Health
Governance, physicians, payers, and consumers have played important roles in
encouraging policy experimentation and new approaches to regulating health

spending continues to grow more rapidly than the nation’s economy, there is renewed interest in
certificate-of-need regulation as a way to improve health planning and help control spending growth.”);
Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, supra note 65, at 62 (arguing that “if the market-oriented approaches
that are ascendant today prove unsatisfactory, public utility regulation is an option worth exploring”);
Barry R. Furrow, Cost Control and the Affordable Care Act: CRAMPing Our Health Care Appetite, 13
NEV. L.J. 822, 850 (2013) (“State governments might revisit the merits of rate regulation, which proved
unpopular in the 1990s and was largely abandoned. More direct regulation of provider rates might set
upper bounds on permissible rates negotiated between health plans and providers in relation to
Medicare rates.”); Fuse Brown, supra note 80, at 85 (“It is time to resurrect rate regulation and place it
squarely in the center of any policy strategy to control health care prices and spending.”).
245. Am. Med. Ass’n v. F.T.C., 455 U.S. 676 (1982); see also Chase-Lubitz, supra note 46,
at 475–78.
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care.246 Nevertheless, health care financing laws have played a prominent role in
creating the conditions leading to these changes in health care delivery laws.
Moreover, although I have solely focused on three areas of health care delivery
laws, there are other examples of how expanding health insurance coverage has
prompted reforms to delivery system regulations. Perhaps most prominently, both
the Medicare/Medicaid legislation and the Affordable Care Act contributed to the
enactment of more stringent fraud and abuse legislation. Congress enacted the
Anti-Kickback statute and the Stark Law in response to the concern that Medicare’s
reimbursement structure was incentivizing providers to engage in unnecessary or
inappropriate care.247 A few decades later, the Affordable Care Act included a
panoply of anti-fraud provisions, including amendments to the Stark and
Anti-Kickback laws, increases in anti-fraud budgets, and new disclosure
requirements for health care providers.248
While a full exploration of the origins of these reforms is beyond the scope of
this Article, Joan Krause suggests that there may be a more general relationship
between health care financing laws and fraud and abuse laws. She observes that
“[h]ealth care fraud is primarily a crime of opportunity, an opportunity created by
the vast sums of money that flow through our complicated health care
reimbursement system,” and posits that “[a]ny effort to increase the number of
people who participate in that system – as health care reform clearly aims to
do – risks an increase in fraud unless countermeasures are taken.”249 Thus, the
overall impacts of health insurance expansions on delivery system laws likely go well
beyond the specific effects described in this Article.
IV. POLITICAL AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Uncovering these interactive effects shows that health care financing laws are
largely responsible for health law’s “dynamism.” In contrast to the perception of
health care delivery laws—and health law in general—as stagnant and inflexible, the
history that has unfolded since the adoption of Medicare, Medicaid, and the

246. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, New Governance Practices in U.S. Health Care, in LAW AND
NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 249 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006);
Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139 (2006).
247. See generally Krause, Integration, Fragmentation, and Human Nature, supra note 11,
at 858–59.
248. Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud: Reflections on a Modern-Day
Yellow Brick Road, 36 AM J. L. MED. 343, 366 (2010) (citing Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010)); see also Jeffrey
B. Hammond, What Exactly Is Healthcare Fraud After the Affordable Care Act?, 42 STETSON
L. REV. 35, 38 (2012) (“Taken in its entirety, the [ACA] represents the largest single, collective change
to federal fraud and abuse law since the creation of the Medicare and the Medicaid programs.”).
249. Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud, supra note 247, at 368–69; see
also Joan H. Krause, Fraud in Universal Coverage: The Usual Suspects (and Then Some), 55
U. KAN. L. REV. 1151, 1151 (2007) (“[W]ith few exceptions, health care fraud is a crime of opportunity
rather than one of desperation. Thus, any reform effort that increases the opportunities to commit
fraud, such as increasing the number of players in the health care system and the obligations imposed
on them, may well end up losing more money to fraudulent activities.”).
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Affordable Care Act shows that these laws have contributed to numerous regulatory
reforms designed to improve access to health care, ensure quality, and reduce health
care spending. Far from remaining fixed, health care delivery law has been in flux
for the last half-century: repeatedly undergoing a variety of complex changes in
response to increases in demand stemming from health care financing laws.
Recognizing this dynamic relationship has two primary implications for the
future of health care reform: First, it implies that further expanding health insurance
would generate political pressure for additional reforms to the health care delivery
system. Second, it strengthens the case for further expanding health insurance
coverage. I argue that health law’s dynamism is normatively desirable since it is
better able to address problems of access, costs, and quality; to adapt to other
changes in the underlying health care system; and to facilitate policy learning.
A. Should Delivery System Reform Come Before Health Insurance Reform?
The question of whether to prioritize expanding health insurance coverage
(sometimes referred to as demand-side health care reform) or reforming the health
care delivery system (sometimes referred to as supply-side reform) has long bedeviled
health care policymakers. President Nixon complained that the Johnson
Administration had enacted Medicare and Medicaid without increasing the supply
of health care providers.250 During the lead-up to the passage of the ACA, one
reported source of tension within the Obama Administration was how much to
prioritize tackling health care spending by reforming the delivery system versus
expanding health insurance coverage.251
Several economists and legal scholars appear to view expanding health
insurance coverage and health care delivery reform not merely as distinct goals, but
as ones that are in competition with one another.252 For instance, Richard Epstein
and David Hyman have argued that deregulation of the health care delivery system
“in ways that will increase quality and reduce the cost of health care” should be
prioritized over further expanding health insurance, and have warned that that
pursuing universal health insurance first will only further lock us into “the current
dysfunctional state of affairs.”253

250. See Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Health Care, supra note 198.
251. See, e.g., BRILL, supra note 16, at 113 (“The economic team wanted to use reform to bend
the cost curve . . . [whereas the] healthcare reform policy team . . . wanted to expand coverage.”).
252. See, e.g., Cochrane, supra note 12, at 162 (“I focus on the supply and demand for health
care, which gives this essay a bit of novelty. Curiously, most of the current policy debate, and most of
our regulation, focuses on health insurance, the question of who will pay the bill, as if the market for
health care were functioning normally.”); Alex Tabarrok, Supply Side Health Care Reform, MARGINAL
REVOLUTION (Mar. 27, 2017), https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/03/supplyside-health-care-reform.html [https://perma.cc/HKZ6-MF5J] (“We fight over health care policy
because we focus on demand and redistribution. We could reach greater agreement if we focused on
supply and innovation.”).
253. Epstein & Hyman, supra note 22, at 516.
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By contrast, this Article suggests that the opposite is true. Far from being in
competition with delivery system reform, improving health insurance coverage can
act as a catalyst to reforming delivery system laws. Although there are still powerful
political economy constraints that favor the status quo in health care, expanding
health insurance coverage is one way to overcome these constraints and enact
meaningful reforms to health care delivery laws.
Contrasting today’s health care delivery system with the one that preceded the
enactment of Medicare and Medicaid helps to bring the effects of expanded
insurance coverage into sharper relief. Until the 1970s, the health care delivery
system “had long been static.”254 Most physicians operated as solo practitioners,
largely insulated from competition, and free from control by corporations and
hospitals.255 The laws governing the health care delivery system—such as the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine and licensing laws—served to support and
preserve this system.256
The health care delivery system today is unrecognizable from the one that
existed roughly half a century ago.257 The past several decades have witnessed the
enactment of a plethora of new laws governing health care professions and
hospitals, as well as modifications and outright repeals of preexisting delivery
system regulations and doctrines. These changes did not happen all at once, but
rather in fits and starts. In the realm of fraud and abuse laws alone, Congress
enacted new legislation at least seven times between the 1970s and 1996.258 Some
regulatory changes—such as CON laws—have been enacted, only to be
substantially scaled back shortly thereafter.
The proliferation of health insurance coverage by laws such as Medicare and
Medicaid has helped to drive these regulatory changes. Given interest groups’
intense efforts to preserve the status quo,259 and their opposition to controlling
health care spending in particular,260 it seems possible that it will take further
increases in the demand for health care to precipitate a sufficiently salient and

254. Agrawal & Veit, supra note 210, at 12.
255. Id.
256. Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155, 162 (2004)
(“The model of professional authority dominated health law and policy in the United States from about
1880 to about 1960. During this period the main point of health law-its more or less conscious
purpose-was to support the authority and autonomy of individual physicians engaged in the private
practice of medicine.”).
257. See Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, supra note 25, at 85 (“Once upon a
time, the U.S. health care industry was not beset on all sides by law and lawyers. Indeed, when I first
surveyed the field of health law in the late 1960s, the list of emergent legal issues in health care was
quite short.”).
258. Id. at 90.
259. See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, JEFFREY M. BERRY, MARIE HOJNACKI, DAVID
C. KIMBALL & BETH L. LEECH, LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND
WHY (2009).
260. See REINHARDT, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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broad-based concern about health care costs that the government will finally enact
more effective cost-control measures. This hypothesis appears supported by John
Kingdon’s work on agenda setting, in which he has argued that the perception of a
problem or a crisis is one of the key factors in determining whether a particular issue
rises to the top of policymakers’ agendas.261
This same logic has been applied to a number of other contexts.262 For
instance, former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has argued that it took the
failure of Lehman Brothers during the 2008–2009 financial crisis to force Congress
to take the unpopular legislative measures that, in his view, were necessary to stave
off an even greater economic disaster.263 Ten years after Lehman’s failure, speaking
for himself, Former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, and Former Chairman
of the Federal Reserve Benjamin Bernanke, Paulson says: “the . . . thing which
we’ve all said is it takes a crisis to get Congress to act.”264 Similarly, in 2008, Rahm
Emanuel, then-Chief of Staff to President-Elect Obama famously said, “you never
want a serious crisis to go to waste . . . Things that we had postponed for too long,
that were long-term, are now immediate and must be dealt with. This crisis provides
the opportunity for us to do things that you could not do before.”265 Scholars have
linked other prominent crises such as the thalidomide tragedy in the 1950s, the
Three Mile Island nuclear accident, and the Love Canal pollution disaster, with
important regulatory and legislative changes.266
Of course, expanding health insurance coverage is distinguishable from these
examples in that it is not in itself a “crisis.” Rather, there are strong independent
justifications for seeking universal health care coverage. As described above, a
growing body of empirical research finds that health insurance expansions improve
financial wellbeing, access to health care, physical and mental health outcomes, and
reduce mortality in certain areas.267 Yet in solving one problem (inadequate
insurance coverage), the government has historically exacerbated concerns about
preexisting problems with the health care system, as well as budgetary concerns, and
in doing so, it has created greater pressure to reform the health care delivery system.

261. See KINGDON, supra note 24, at 90–115.
262. Daniel Carpenter & Jisela Sin, Policy, Tragedy, and the Emergence of Regulation: The Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 STUD. AMER. POL. DEV. 149, 153 (2007) (“The claim that regulation
follows certain critical events (either actual events or journalistic exposes) is common to historians of
numerous fields of regulation.”).
263. Panic, Fear and Regret, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 20, 2018), https://features.marketplace.org/
bernanke-paulson-geithner/ [ https://perma.cc/J8JX-HMAD ] (“[O]ne thing the Lehman shock
did was energized the system politically, and that was . . . what it ended up taking for us to get
these emergency authorities to let us to recapitalize the whole financial system and avoid a
catastrophe . . . . But it took an emergency to get them to act.”)
264. Id. (emphasis added).
265. Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 21, 2008), https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/SB122721278056345271 [ https://perma.cc/2L57-JEN6 ].
266. Carpenter & Sin, supra note 262, at 153.
267. See, e.g., Sommers, Gawande & Baicker, supra note 89.
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Importantly, while expanding health insurance tends to lead to reforming
delivery system laws, it does not determine the direction that that reform will take.268
For instance, historically, opponents of expanding health insurance coverage have
been wary that doing so would lead to greater government involvement in health
care.269 These concerns were not completely unfounded: Medicare and Medicaid
did contribute to the enactment of CON laws, after all. However, as this Article
shows, in some instances, health insurance expansions have (perhaps surprisingly)
contributed to scaling back delivery system regulations. For instance, Medicare,
Medicaid, and the ACA have indirectly contributed to the loosening of scope of
practice restrictions governing non-physician health professionals, and to the
weakening of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. (The genesis of the HMO
Act in particular—which reportedly was precipitated by a chance encounter
between Paul Ellwood and a Nixon administration official on a plane270—suggests
there is nothing preordained about the form that a particular policy solution will
take.) Thus, it is possible that achieving universal health insurance will have both
regulatory and deregulatory effects.
In sum, in contrast to the prevailing view, expanding health insurance coverage
is in fact an effective way to overcome the political obstacles to reforming health
care delivery and make the regulatory system more capable of change. Would-be
delivery system reformers thus have reason to desire expanding health insurance
coverage, rather than treating these delivery system reforms as being in tension with
expanding health insurance coverage.
B. Is Dynamism Normatively Desirable?
Having a dynamic system means that regulators are continually in the process
of evaluating and amending delivery system regulations, then monitoring and
assessing the consequences of those amendments in practice, making further
changes when necessary, and so on. This dynamism has three primary advantages
in the context of health care delivery system regulations: it creates pressure to enact
reforms to improve health care access, costs, and quality; it enables delivery systems
268. See Carpenter & Sin, supra note 262, at 178 (“Our general conclusion, then, is that crises
can in fact ‘lead to’ or ‘cause’ regulation, but the way in which they do so is politically contingent on the
action of framing, an action that no one actor can entirely control.”).
269. For example, the American Medical Association historically opposed efforts to establish a
national health insurance program on the grounds that doing so would lead to radical incursions on
physicians’ autonomy and “socialized medicine.” See, e.g., CHAPIN, supra note 46, at 160 (“AMA leaders
understood that once third parties controlled the capital flowing through the health care system then
doctors would occupy a defensive position, both professionally and economically. Cost containment
measures would inevitably entail diminished doctor sovereignty.”); STARR, REMEDY AND REACTION,
supra note 184, at 45 (describing how Ronald Reagan delivered a speech as part of an AMA campaign
against the Medicare legislation, in which he explained that “[t]he Medicare bill . . . was part of a larger
plot to bring socialism to America” and that “[s]oon the government would be telling doctors where to
practice”).
270. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.

Second to Printer_Scheffler (Do Not Delete)

774

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

3/4/2020 5:31 PM

[Vol. 10:729

regulations to adapt to other changes in the health care system; and it facilitates
policy learning.
1. Prompting Policies to Address Access, Costs, and Quality
As described above, health economists and policymakers have historically
been quite concerned that expanding health insurance coverage would lead to excess
demand for health care, and that the total costs of expansion would therefore exceed
the total benefits.271 John Nyman notes that beginning in the 1970s, the
predominance of moral hazard theory led “generations of health economists . . . to
view health insurance as problematic,” and suggests that the predominance of this
view explains why “few American health economists during this period called for
the creation of a national health insurance program.”272
Recognizing the dynamic relationship between health insurance and regulatory
reform reveals an important but overlooked wrinkle in this discussion. It shows
that, precisely by increasing the demand for health care, the expansion of coverage
generates pressure for policymakers to enact regulatory reforms which aim to
address problems of access, costs, and quality. These reforms are framed as being
necessary to prevent or mitigate unintended effects stemming from the increased
demand for health care, but the problems they focus on (e.g., access, costs) are
persistent problems in any health care system. These regulatory responses have been
largely unappreciated and even unnoticed. Although some economists have
investigated how health insurance expansions have affected the health care system
as a whole over time, they typically have treated the regulatory environment as fixed,
and have not accounted for any corresponding regulatory adaptation.273
Part III shows a few ways in which expanding health insurance coverage has
prompted regulators to enact policies aimed at improving health care access and
271. See supra notes 95–100 and accompanying text.
272. Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation, supra note 89, at 765. In recent
years, economists’ views toward the expansion of health insurance appear to have become more
favorable, possibly in response to the critiques of moral hazard theory or to the empirical evidence
about the value of health insurance. For instance, a 2015 survey of a group of prominent academic
economists found that over two-thirds of them either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement,
“[e]xpanding health insurance to more people through the ACA’s public subsidies and Medicaid
expansion will generate gains in the health and well-being of the newly insured that exceed the costs,”
while nearly one-quarter was either uncertain or disagreed. Chi. Booth, Health Insurance Subsidies, IGM
FORUM (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/health-insurance-subsidies [ https://
perma.cc/Y5PG-EXG7 ]. Nevertheless, concerns about excess demand stemming from health
insurance remain influential today.
273. See Finkelstein, The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance, supra note 122, at 2 (“The basic
insight is that market-wide changes in health insurance may have fundamentally different effects on the
health care sector than what partial equilibrium analyses such as the Rand Experiment would suggest.”).
Curiously, one exception is physician shortages: some health scholars argued that the ACA would not
lead to a physician shortage, in part based on the assumption that states were likely to revise their scope
of practice laws. See Scott Gottlieb & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, No, There Won’t Be a Doctor Shortage,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2013, at A35.
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costs. For instance, several states have loosened their scope of practice restrictions
in response to concerns that expanding health insurance coverage would reduce
access to health care by leading to a physician shortage. Loosened scope of practice
restrictions have in turn served to increase the number of health care providers and
improve patients’ access to health care, especially for rural and vulnerable
populations.274 The proportion of primary care being provided by NPs and
Physician Assistants has increased substantially in recent years,275 and states with
more expansive scope of practice laws have more NPs, greater growth in NPs, and
more care provision by NPs.276
Similarly, the erosion of the corporate practice of medicine doctrine has likely
played a role in curbing health care spending. The enactment of the HMO Act and
the erosion of the corporate practice doctrine also contributed to the “managed care
revolution,” which in turn led to a moderation in health care spending growth
during the 1990s.277 Managed care companies helped to limit physician and facility
fees and curb unnecessary care.278 Partly as a result, health care spending slowed for
more than a decade, and barely budged at all from 1993 to 1998.279 Although the
rise of managed care ultimately precipitated a political backlash, it continues to play
an important role in controlling health care spending today.280
274. See, e.g., Adams & Markowitz, supra note 37, at 6 (“By unnecessarily limiting the tasks that
qualified APPs [advanced practice providers] can perform, SOP [scope of practice] restrictions
exacerbate [primary care] shortages and limit access to care. At the same time, researchers have not
found evidence that less-restrictive SOP is associated with any diminution of quality or any harms to
public health.”); Diane Alexander & Molly Schnell, Just What the Nurse Practitioner Ordered: Independent
Prescriptive Authority and Population Mental Health (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper
No. 2017-8, 2019) (finding that broadening prescriptive authority for Nurse Practitioners is associated
with improvements in mental health and decreases in mortality related to mental health); Morris
M. Kleiner, Allison Marier, Kyoung Won Park & Coady Wing, Relaxing Occupational Licensing
Requirements: Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service, 59 J.L. & ECON. 261 (2016) (finding
that more stringent scope of practice restrictions for NPs increase the price of well-child visits without
any evidence of improved health outcomes).
275. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer & Laurie Bauer, Rethinking the Primary Care Workforce
— An Expanded Role for Nurses, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1015 (2016); Hillary Barnes, Michael
R. Richards, Matthew D. McHugh & Grant Martsolf, Rural and Nonrural Primary Care Physician
Practices Increasingly Rely on Nurse Practitioners, 37 HEALTH AFF. 908 (2018).
276. See Ying Xue et al., Impact of State Nurse Practitioner Scope-of-Practice Regulation on Health
Care Delivery: Systematic Review, 64 NURSING OUTLOOK 71, 73 (2016).
277. See Agrawal & Veit, supra note 210, at 41 (“The managed care industry did slow health care
spending. Thirty years of data showed that managed care plans brought hospital costs under control by
eliminating unnecessary hospital stays and by limiting hospital lengths of stay.”); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The
Predictable Managed Care Kvetch on the Rocky Road from Adolescence to Adulthood, 24 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 897, 905 (1999) (“The managed care industry also can take credit for having been
instrumental in breaking, at long last, the intolerable upward spiral in American health spending that
had been driven for decades by the old, ‘employer-provided’ health insurance system.”).
278. Clark C. Havighurst, Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics Make Bad
Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395, 396–97 (2001).
279. Agrawal & Veit, supra note 210, at 42.
280. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker, Michael Chernew & Jacob Robbins, The Spillover Effects of
Medicare Managed Care: Medicare Advantage and Hospital Utilization, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 1289 (2013)
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Although Part III focuses primarily on initiatives to address health care access
and costs, it briefly outlines how Medicare and Medicaid contributed to the
enactment of fraud and abuse laws that were intended to prevent over-utilization,
as well as “excess commercialization” and “distorting incentives” that might
interfere with the quality of patient care.281 Although the current fraud and abuse
regime is far from perfect, even some of its most fervent proponents of deregulation
in health care concede that it serves a necessary role in guarding against unnecessary
care.282
That is not to claim that every regulatory change stemming from health care
financing laws is ideal, or that it always improves efficiency. As most clearly
illustrated by the example of CON laws, regulators will inevitably on occasion
“overshoot the optimal mark.”283 Yet even in the case of CON laws, which have
been subject to nearly uniform criticism in recent years, different health scholars
have drawn different lessons from the nation’s experience with those laws—and
some scholars now view economic regulation of the health care sector as the most
promising means of controlling prices.284 Thus, although there is no guarantee that
regulators will always enact optimal policies, having a dynamic regulatory system
means that at least regulators are capable of changing delivery system regulations to
address problems of access, costs, and quality, and they may continue to adjust their
policy responses until they have the intended effect.
2. Adapting to Other Changes in the Regulatory Environment
A dynamic regulatory system is also able to evolve in response to other
changes in the underlying health care system, such as technological developments
or new modes in delivering patient care.285 A regulatory scheme designed to fulfill

(finding that enrollment in Medicare managed care leads to declining hospital costs both in the
Medicare and commercially insured population); David Dranove, Christopher Ody & Amanda Starc,
A Dose of Managed Care: Controlling Drug Spending in Medicaid, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 23956, 2017) (finding that Medicaid managed care organizations reduce drug
spending); see also Trubek, New Governance Practices in U.S. Health Care, supra note 246, at 249 (“The
managed care backlash came about in part by an alliance between physicians and consumers to fight
the intrusion of the ‘outsiders’ into the physician-patient relationship. Although physicians won this
battle, managed care had changed the environment in which they practised through the development
of large integrated hospital and clinic systems, where most physicians now practise; the creation of
evidence-based medicine; and increased reliance on allied health care professionals.”).
281. HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 56, at 1372.
282. Epstein & Hyman, supra note 22, at 533 (“We do not suggest repeal of the anti-kickback
statute. Although we believe those responsible at HHS should create more safe harbors and be more
flexible in their interpretation of the statute in advisory opinions, the statute is an important guardian
of the fiscal integrity of the Medicare program, given that the overwhelming majority of Medicare
beneficiaries are still in the traditional (fee-for-service) part of the program, where kickbacks pose an
obvious incentive for overutilization.”).
283. Saver, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 675.
284. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
285. See Elhauge, Health Care Fragmentation, supra note 7, at 16 (“Indeed, the level and types of
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one purpose may become unnecessary (or give rise to unintended consequences) if
the surrounding environment changes. For instance, it is widely believed that
anti-fraud and abuse laws need to be revised as the health care system shifts away
from fee-for-service reimbursement toward value-based payment.286
One especially vexing problem for regulators is how to adapt regulations in
the face of innovation.287 If regulations remain fixed and constant, then they risk
stifling beneficial innovations. This has long been one of the primary critiques of
health law: that it is stagnant and path dependent, and suppresses innovations that
would otherwise improve the health care delivery system.288 In addition, static
regulatory schemes are also thought to be more vulnerable to “bad” innovations
aimed at subverting or bypassing regulatory protections.289
Again, there are reasons to think that these considerations are especially
important in the context of health care delivery regulations, given the necessity of
developing modes of delivering patient care that are higher-quality and more
cost-effective. Peter Jacobson, Laura Napiewocki, and Leah Voigt emphasize the
necessity of having a dynamic regulatory system that evolves in response to changes
in technology and health care delivery:
[T]he goal of regulation should be to facilitate market arrangements rather
than to replace them. To achieve this goal, the regulatory approach must
be dynamic and flexible. That is, regulators must be able to respond to
innovative market arrangements within a realistic length of time. Most
important, the regulatory framework must better reflect changes in how
health care is organized and how physicians deliver care. It must also
facilitate needed changes in the delivery system, yet retain flexibility to
adapt to new ways of providing health care.290

integration that are most effective are likely to change over time with changes in technology, costs, and
consumer preferences, just as they do in other industries, so it is important to maintain a legal
framework that allows such shifts over time.”); see also Wendy Wagner, William West, Thomas McGarity
& Lisa Peters, Dynamic Rulemaking, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 183, 242 (2017) (arguing that perhaps the most
important normative advantage of dynamism in the context of administrative rulemaking is that “an
agency may employ dynamic rulemaking to adapt to changes in the physical, technological, or policy
environment in which it operates.”).
286. See, e.g., Carmel Schachar, Are Fraud and Abuse Laws Stifling Value-Based Care?, NEW
ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (Sept. 12, 2018), https://catalyst.nejm.org/fraud-and-abuse-laws-stiflingvalue-based-care/ [ https://perma.cc/X7D5-HJQX?type=image ].
287. See generally CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND
JUSTICE 144 (2017) (inquiring “whether it is possible to develop a regulatory approach whose
fundamental underlying assumptions include . . . the default presumption that innovation will be
continually changing the regulatory context and object, undermining and potentially circumventing
regulation, and potentially obscuring or making irrelevant its stated purposes.”).
288. See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
289. Cary Coglianese, Innovation and Regulatory Vigilance, JOTWELL (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://adlaw.jotwell.com/innovation-and-regulatory-vigilance/ [ https://perma.cc/MF3U-XDGV ]
(reviewing CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE
(2017)).
290. Jacobson, Napiewocki & Voigt, supra note 14, at 587–88.
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Dynamic regulations are particularly important in parts of the health care
system where technology is evolving quickly.291 For instance, Nicholson Price has
advocated for a “flexible, adaptive approach” to regulating what he calls “Black Box
Medicine,” health care providers’ growing reliance on opaque algorithms in
delivering medical care.292 To the extent that expanding health insurance creates the
conditions for policymakers to reform and readjust health care delivery laws, they
will be more flexible and better able to adapt to these types of developments.
3. Facilitating Policy Learning
Finally, a dynamic regulatory system facilitates policy learning. It enables
policymakers to experiment with riskier policies that may be desirable because of
their potential benefits, or because they may help to elicit knowledge about the best
regulatory approach.293 It does so because if regulators do implement policies that
turn out to be unsuccessful, then they are able to correct them at a later stage; by
contrast, if the policies are successful, then they may retain them.294
Scholars have long emphasized the importance of dynamism in facilitating
policy learning and leading to the development of better regulations.295 For instance,
some scholars in the field of “New Governance” have advocated for “adaptive”
regulations that “continuously generate new learning and . . . adjust in response to
new information and changing conditions.”296 Similarly, several scholars have
promoted the notion of “adaptive management,” which is thought of as “an

291. Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 572 (2017) (arguing that
a “decentralized, incremental, or experimentalist” regulatory approach is appropriate for “complex and
rapidly developing technology”).
292. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 459 (2017).
293. See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 534 (2008)
(emphasizing the desirability of “reversibility” in policy because of the potential of
high-variance/low-expected-value policies to “provide better outcomes and better knowledge”).
294. Id.; see also Wagner, West, McGarity & Peters, supra note 285, at 242 (“Dynamic rulemaking
has many desirable characteristics. Most would agree that it is needed to correct errors in previously
promulgated rules.”).
295. See, e.g., Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959).
296. Bradley C. Karkkainen, ‘New Governance’ in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting
As Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 474 (2004); see, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89
MINN. L. REV. 342, 395–96 (2004) (“The regulatory model has often proved stagnant and sluggish,
curtailing revision and improvement . . . . While regulation has been an ordering act, governing is a
learning process. The new model is better positioned to accept uncertainty and diversity, advancing
iteratively toward workable solutions. The role of law is to promote practices that allow revision
and improvement.”); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal
Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 542 (2007) (“The
continual change and expansion of knowledge which characterize society means that all solutions
should be regarded as provisional. Given this situation, it seems preferable for legislators to develop
broad frameworks, but let stakeholders develop concrete solutions based on easily revisable rules.”).
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iterative, incremental decisionmaking process built around a continuous process of
monitoring the effects of decisions and adjusting decisions accordingly.”297
Although this Article has primarily emphasized how expanding health
insurance coverage influenced changes in delivery system laws, policy learning
played a role in these changes as well. For instance, as described above, the ongoing
curtailment of scope of practice restrictions has been influenced by a body of
evidence that some non-physician providers can deliver a broader array of services
without compromising the quality of patient care.298
Certificate of Need laws present another example of policy learning, albeit an
incomplete one. Congress repealed the federal pro-CON law in 1987, leading
several other states to repeal their own CON laws thereafter—though the drive to
repeal CON laws appears to have stalled in recent years.299 One factor contributing
to the decline of CON laws was that policymakers increasingly began to
believe—based in part on a burgeoning body of empirical research—that these laws
were ineffective at controlling health care spending.300
Promoting policy learning is especially important in the context of health care
delivery system regulations, given that there is substantial epistemic uncertainty
surrounding the appropriate strategy for regulating the delivery of health care.
Timothy Jost and Ezekiel Emanuel have written that although the current delivery
system “fails to generate optimal results, the best alternative is unknown,” and “it is
unlikely that there is a single best way to organize and deliver health care services.”301
Kieran Walshe and Stephen Shortell survey health care regulators and regulated
entities and find substantial variation as to these parties’ beliefs about the optimal
regulatory approach.302 To the extent that the regulatory system is dynamic and
policymakers are able to reverse course in the future, the effects of any negative or
unintended outcomes created by pursuing these policies will be minimized.
Of course, dynamism by itself is not sufficient to guarantee policy learning.
There is a danger that regulators may careen haphazardly from one regulatory
approach to another, without learning from past experiences. Yet dynamism is a
necessary condition for policy learning: the more dynamic a system is (i.e., the easier
it is for regulators to change course in the future), the less costly it is for regulators

297. J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI.
& TECH. 21, 28 (2005). Holly Doremus calls this process “learning by doing.” Holly Doremus,
Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547,
550 (2007); see, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the
Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424 (2010).
298. See supra note 37.
299. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text.
300. See Bagley, Medicine As a Public Calling, supra note 65, at 89; Conover & Sloan, supra note
73, at 456–57.
301. Jost & Emanuel, supra note 7, at 2561.
302. See Walshe & Shortell, supra note 27, at 92.
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to experiment with policies that are likely to yield the most information about the
best policy.303 Moreover, just as health insurance expansions create pressure for
policymakers to experiment with regulatory reforms, they may also encourage policy
learning by rendering certain policy problems more salient, and by generating
“natural experiments” which researchers can then evaluate and use to inform future
policy design.304
*

*

*

To be sure, dynamic regulations are not appropriate in every context. For
instance, dynamism may be undesirable for regulations that apply primarily to
individuals or small businesses, given that—unlike larger and better-resourced
regulated entities—they may not have sufficient capacity to understand and comply
with regulations that are often changing.305 Dynamism may also be inappropriate
for areas of regulation that signal strong normative commitments (such as civil
rights or child labor laws), where frequent tinkering might appear to undermine the
strength of those commitments.306
Still, there are reasons to think health law’s dynamism is, on balance, a positive
force for improving health care delivery. A dynamic regulatory system in health care
is able to address problems of access, costs and quality, to adapt to other changes
in the underlying health care system, and to facilitate policy learning and correct
regulatory missteps. These virtues are particularly important in health care, which is
characterized by increasing demand, rapidly evolving technology and modes of
delivering patient care, and substantial uncertainty as to the proper approach to
delivering health care.
CONCLUSION
In contrast to the perception of delivery system laws as stagnant and
antiquated, this Article shows that they are continually being revised and amended,
and that this dynamism is a neglected strength of health law. That is not to deny the
problems with the current regulations governing the delivery of health care. Yet it
shows that by increasing the demand for health care, laws that expand health
insurance coverage have cascading effects on the health care delivery system over
303. See Listokin, supra note 293, at 534.
304. For instance, there have been numerous recent high-quality empirical studies that have
exploited the expansion in health insurance coverage under the ACA to study the effects of health
insurance on financial security, health care access, and health outcomes. See, e.g., Sommers, Gawande
& Baicker, supra note 89.
305. See Jonathan H. Adler, Dynamic Environmentalism and Adaptive Management: Legal
Obstacles and Opportunities, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 133, 154 (2015) (“A system in which agencies were
free to recalibrate regulatory obligations would provide little certainty for regulated entities . . . . Insofar
as agencies maintain discretion to alter their decisions, they risk upsetting the expectations of those that
have relied upon the agency’s decision.”).
306. Craig & Ruhl, supra note 297, at 25.
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time, in ways that frequently heighten preexisting concerns about access, costs,
and quality.
This conclusion has clear implications for the future of health care reform.
First, it shows that expanding health insurance coverage helps to build momentum
for reforming health care delivery laws. Thus, counterintuitive though it may seem,
one way to achieve more fundamental reforms to delivery system laws—and to
delivery of health care—would be to further expand health insurance coverage.
Second, recognizing this relationship strengthens the normative case for
further expanding health insurance coverage. It shows that that the doing so helps
to generate pressure for regulatory reforms to improve health care access, costs, and
quality; it enables delivery systems regulations to adapt to other changes in the health
care system, such as new technologies and new modes of delivering patient care;
and it facilitates policy learning.
This dynamic relationship also has implications for the field of health law.
Health law scholars have long grappled with the perception that health law is a
“patchwork” of complex and divergent laws with little internal coherence.307 This
is at least in part because health law lacks many of the features of more traditional
legal fields: it has no single unifying legal form; it has no central institutional actor;
and it has evolved often by historical accident rather than through a more linear
orderly process.308
Health law scholars have responded to this perception in different ways: some
have argued that health law deserves recognition as a distinct field because it
addresses a unique set of relations among persons and because the law
accommodates these relations in distinctive ways.309 Others have tried to show that
a specific analytical or normative paradigm—such as a market approach or a
patients’ right approach—explains the features of health law.310
By contrast, rather than trying to impose a single unifying framework,
M. Gregg Bloche argues that health law is best understood as an “emergent system,”

307. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 26, at 321 (“The law of health care provision is a chaotic,
dysfunctional patchwork.”); Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1452
(1994) (“Health law policy suffers from an identifiable pathology . . . . [H]ealth care law borrows
haphazardly from other fields of law, each of which has its own internally coherent conceptual logic,
but which in combination results in an incoherent legal framework and perverse incentive structures.”).
308. Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law’s Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625, 627 (2008).
309. Einer Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 365, 371 (2006) (“It seems to me that health law does meet the above functional test for what
constitutes a field of law. Many different legal fields may, in some sense, apply to the health care
industry but seem transformed in significant ways by the application . . . . The distinctiveness of health
care relations thus does seem to change the applicable law.”); Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of
Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 362–63 (2006) (“[H]ealth care
law is an academic sub-discipline that inquires how law should and does take account of the special
features of medicine and treatment relationships.”).
310. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Where Is the “There” in Health Law? Can It Become a
Coherent Field?, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 101, 102 (2004).
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one arising from “[c]ountless market actors, public planners, and legal and
regulatory decisionmakers interact[ing] in oft-chaotic ways, clashing with,
reinforcing, and adjusting to each other.”311 He argues that health law should be
treated as a distinct field because better understanding these interactions is an
essential prerequisite for figuring out how to improve the health care system, and
because “legal scholars and practitioners who specialize in health care . . . are best
situated to see how the moving parts fit together.”312
This Article shows one important way in which “the moving parts fit
together,” and in doing so, it illustrates the importance of studying health law
holistically. These dynamic interactions and the lessons drawn from them suggest
that it is not an arbitrary choice to have a field of law organized around the health
care system: examining health law holistically enables health law scholars to uncover
interactive effects that reverberate throughout different parts of the health care
system and to chart important relationships and effects that bear on the future of
health care reform.313

311. M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 389, 478 (2009).
Ted Ruger has proposed a similar rationale, arguing that it is health law’s very multiplicity of legal forms
and actors that distinguishes it as a scholarly field. Ruger, supra note 308, at 639.
312. Bloche, supra note 311, at 396–97.
313. Id. at 404.

